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SAME-SEX PARENTS 
CATHERINE E. SMITH  
ABSTRACT 
Gay rights litigation and advocacy traditionally have focused on the 
unequal treatment of gay and lesbian individuals and couples; less 
attention has been dedicated explicitly to the legal rights of the children of 
gay and lesbian parents. This Article asserts that a child of same-sex 
parents denied a government benefit has a cognizable equal protection 
challenge—a legal claim that is separate and distinct from that of the 
child’s gay or lesbian parents. It is well-settled equal protection law that 
the government may not treat nonmarital children differently than marital 
children because of moral disdain for their parents’ relationship, and laws 
classifying children based on their parents’ marital status are subject to 
intermediate scrutiny. Today, a majority of states exclude children of 
same-sex parents from the economic benefits that could be derived from 
their non-biological same-sex parent, including health insurance, 
workers’ compensation benefits, child support, and social security 
benefits. When medical events, divorces, lay-offs or death occur in the 
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lives of children of same-sex parents in these “no-protection” states, they 
are denied important economic safety nets—safety nets that children of 
married and unmarried opposite-sex parents enjoy. As a subset of 
nonmarital children, children of same-sex parents exercise no control over 
their parents’ conduct, but suffer concrete economic injuries because of 
the state’s imputation of immorality to them. This government-sponsored 
discrimination cannot be fairly justified on the basis of preserving 
traditional family values or on the basis of ensuring administrative 
efficiency. “No-protection” states must dismantle the insurmountable 
barrier that blocks children of same-sex parents from establishing a legal 
relationship with their non-biological same-sex parent, and place them on 
equal footing with their opposite-sex parented peers. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
What about the children?
1
 
Gay-rights litigation and advocacy have traditionally focused on the 
unequal treatment of gay and lesbian individuals and couples; less has 
been dedicated explicitly to the legal rights of the children of gay and 
lesbian parents.
2
 To date, no state or federal court has directly addressed 
what level of scrutiny applies to children who face discrimination because 
of their same-sex parents‘ relationships.3 In one of the few cases brought 
directly on behalf of children of same-sex parents, a trial judge dismissed 
the children‘s equal protection claim against a same-sex marriage ban as 
lacking ―any precedent directly on point . . . that the minor [p]laintiffs may 
assert such ‗derivative‘ claims.‖4 Surprisingly, the court‘s conclusion does 
not comport with the history of successful equal protection challenges by 
children who are discriminated against because of the moral disdain of 
 
 
 1. Many scholars have laid the foundation for the approach taken in this Article. See, e.g., Harry 
D. Krause, Equal Protection for the Illegitimate, 65 MICH. L. REV. 477 (1967); HARRY D. KRAUSE, 
ILLEGITIMACY: LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY (1971); Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg: A 
Child-Centered Perspective on Parents’ Rights, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1747 (1993); Gilbert A. Holmes, 
The Tie that Binds: The Constitutional Right of Children to Maintain Relationships With Parent-Like 
Individuals, 53 MD. L. REV. 358 (1994). 
 2. See Lewis A. Silverman, Suffer the Little Children: Justifying Same-Sex Marriage from the 
Perspective of a Child of the Union, 102 W. VA. L. REV. 411, 412 (1999) (―The preponderance of the 
dialogue about same-sex marriage concentrates on the adult partners and their derivative benefits from 
the relationship; precious little focus is given to the rights of a child who may be a product of a same-
sex relationship.‖).  
 3. In light of the Supreme Court‘s ruling in United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 786 (2012), 
children in marriage equality states are now eligible for both state and federal benefits. This does not 
significantly change the plight of children in ―no-protection‖ states as discussed in this Article. 
Windsor was decided as this Article moved to publication. For a more complete discussion of Windsor 
and its effects, see Catherine E. Smith, Windsor’s Progeny (forthcoming) (on file with author). 
 4. See Varnum v. Brien, No. CV5965, 2007 WL 2468667, at *46 (Iowa Dist. Aug. 30, 2007), 
aff’d, 763 N.W.2d 862, 872 (Iowa 2009). See also In re Doe, 2008 WL 5006172 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 2008). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
1592 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 90:1589 
 
 
 
 
their parents‘ relationships.5 It is well-settled equal protection law that the 
government may not treat nonmarital children (once called illegitimate 
children)
6
 differently than marital children, and such distinctions are 
subject to intermediate scrutiny. A child of same-sex parents denied a 
government benefit has a cognizable equal protection challenge—a legal 
claim that is separate and distinct from that of the child‘s gay and lesbian 
parents.
7
 
In a significant number of states, in what this Article will refer to as 
―no-protection‖ states, children of same-sex parents are excluded from 
countless rights and benefits in relation to their non-biological same-sex 
parent, including health insurance coverage, workers‘ compensation 
benefits, child support, social security benefits, inheritance, and wrongful 
death recovery.
8
 Shockingly, even when courts acknowledge these 
injuries, they simply treat the economic harms to the child as abstract 
collateral damage in the legal wrangling over same-sex marriage.
9
 While 
supporters and opponents of gay rights invest millions of dollars into the 
battle over same-sex marriage in states like California that extend 
significant legal protections to same-sex couples and their children, ―no-
protection‖ states operate a complete caste system.  
 
 
 5. See Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 72 (1968) (holding, in an action brought on behalf of 
nonmarital children for the wrongful death of their mother, that it was ―invidious to discriminate 
against [the children] when no action, conduct, or demeanor of theirs is possibly relevant to the harm 
that was done the mother‖). 
 6. Throughout this Article, the author uses the term ―nonmarital children,‖ and will only use the 
term ―illegitimate‖ when quoting cases or using the term in a historical sense.  
 7. A party has a direct ―cause of action‖ where the factual situation underlying the action 
entitles the party to maintain an action in a judicial tribunal. BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY 251 (9th ed. 
2009). A derivative action is ―[a] lawsuit arising from an injury to another person, such as a husband‘s 
action for loss of consortium arising from an injury to his wife caused by a third person.‖ Id. at 509. 
This Article argues that the children of same-sex couples have a direct cause of action for economic 
injuries suffered by them, as opposed to a claim derived from an injury to their parent(s). Issues of 
standing are beyond the scope of this Article. 
 8. See Linda L. Elrod, A Child’s Perspective of Defining a Parent: The Case for Intended 
Parenthood, 25 BYU J. PUB. L. 245, 248 (2011); Kathy T. Graham, Same-Sex Couples: Their Rights 
as Parents, and Their Children’s Rights as Children, 48 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 999, 1002, 1119 
(2008); William Mason Emnett, Queer Conflicts: Mediating Parenting Disputes Within the Gay 
Community, 86 GEO. L.J. 433, 437 (1997) (―By and large, courts . . . have refused to extend custody or 
visitation rights to gay co-parents.‖). 
 9. For example, in an unsuccessful constitutional challenge to Arizona‘s same-sex marriage 
ban, the Arizona Court of Appeals explained that ―although the line drawn between couples who may 
marry (opposite-sex) and those who may not (same-sex) may result in some inequity for children 
raised by same-sex couples, such inequity was insufficient to negate [Arizona‘s] link between 
opposite-sex marriage, procreation, and child-rearing.‖ Standhardt v. Superior Court, 77 P.3d 451, 463 
(Ariz. Ct. App. 2003). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol90/iss6/2
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Children of same-sex parents are certainly relevant to the gay rights 
debate,
10
 and they are a growing population in number and visibility. 
According to the United States Census, twenty-eight percent of 
cohabitating same-sex couples are raising at least one child under the age 
of eighteen.
11
 The exact number is unknown; however, social scientists 
estimate that our nation is home to somewhere between 300,000 and 
1 million children being raised by same-sex couples, and the number of 
single gays and lesbians raising children increases this estimate to at least 
two million children.
12
 Like children of opposite-sex parents, children of 
gay and lesbian parents live through the entire range of experiences that 
define family life, including crises in their households such as medical 
events, divorces, lay-offs, and deaths.
13
 Further, contrary to the popular 
―affluent gay stereotype,‖ children of same-sex couples are in need of the 
benefits that they are denied. These children are twice as likely to live in 
poverty in comparison to marital children,
14
 and their parents have lower 
median and average incomes than married opposite-sex couples raising 
children.
15
 Yet, when crises occur in the lives of children of same-sex 
couples, ―no-protection‖ states may deny these children benefits 
 
 
 10. For a discussion about childrens‘ interests, see Nancy D. Polikoff, For the Sake of All 
Children: Opponents and Supporters of Same-Sex Marriage Both Miss the Mark, 8 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 
573, 586 (2005); Benjamin G. Ledsham, Means to Legitimate Ends: Same-Sex Marriage Through the 
Lens of Illegitimacy-Based Discrimination, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2373, 2375 (2007); Courtney G. 
Joslin, Searching for Harm: Same-Sex Marriage and the Well-Being of Children, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. 
L. REV. 81, 85 89 (2011); Ruth Butterfield Isaacson, “Teachable Moments”: The Use of Child-
Centered Arguments in the Same-Sex Marriage Debate, 98 CAL. L. REV. 121, 131 51 (2010). 
 11. GARY J. GATES & JASON OST, THE GAY AND LESBIAN ATLAS 45 (2004). The exact number 
of cohabitating same-sex couples with at least one child is unknown because there is a significant 
undercount: lesbian couples and those involving a bisexual woman were twice as likely as other same-
sex couples to report that they live with a child to whom they had not given birth. See Todd Brower, 
It’s Not Just Shopping, Urban Lofts, and the Lesbian Gay-by Boom: How Sexual Orientation 
Demographics Can Inform Family Courts, 17 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL‘Y & L. 1, 15 (2009) (citing 
GARY J. GATES ET AL., ADOPTION AND FOSTER CARE BY GAY AND LESBIAN PARENTS IN THE UNITED 
STATES 5 (2007)). 
 12. See Brower, supra note 11, at 27. Most recent estimates place the figure at roughly two 
million children being raised by LGBT parents. See MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, ALL 
CHILDREN MATTER: HOW LEGAL AND SOCIAL INEQUALITIES HURT LGBT FAMILIES 1 (2011) 
[hereinafter CHILDREN MATTER REPORT], available at http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2011/ 
10/pdf/all_children_matter.pdf. 
 13. See Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 171 (1972) (―Both the statute in Levy 
and the statute in the present case involve state-created compensation schemes, designed to provide 
close relatives and dependents of a deceased a means of recovery for his often abrupt and accidental 
death.‖). 
 14. CHILDREN MATTER REPORT, supra note 12, at 8. For a comprehensive discussion of the 
benefits denied children in same-sex families, see id. at 51–78. See generally LEE BADGETT, MONEY, 
MYTHS AND CHANGE: THE ECONOMIC LIVES OF LESBIANS AND GAY MEN (2001). 
 15. CHILDREN MATTER REPORT, supra note 12, at 8. 
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specifically designed to serve as safety nets to protect children within 
family units—benefits that children of married parents obtain as a matter 
of course.
16
  
As a generation of children with gay and lesbian parents come of age in 
significant numbers and begin to collectively assert their rights, anti-gay 
policies that subject them to different treatment than their opposite-sex 
parented peers will be subjected to further social and legal scrutiny.
17
 
―[T]imes can blind us to certain truths and later generations can see that 
laws once thought necessary and proper in fact serve only to oppress. As 
the Constitution endures, persons in every generation can invoke its 
principles in their own search for greater freedom.‖18 Children of same-sex 
parents will change the face of the LGBT movement and push the 
boundaries of this evolving social and legal battleground.
19
  
This Article offers a blueprint for an equal protection challenge to 
remedy government-sponsored discrimination against children of same-
sex parents. For practical purposes, this Article suggests that the ideal 
plaintiff would be a child who has been denied a government benefit in a 
―no-protection‖ state, who has same-sex parents, one biological and the 
other non-biological, and where there is no legal relationship between the 
child and the donor or surrogate. This Article also focuses on state-level 
benefits and responsibilities. In this context, this Article first brings to the 
forefront the unequal treatment of children of same-sex parents who are 
denied equal treatment in comparison with marital children. It also 
identifies the inadequacies of potential state justifications for the disparate 
treatment of children with same-sex parents and offers a number of legal 
strategies that states could adopt to remedy these unconstitutional 
 
 
 16. For a list of privileges that benefit mono-racial couples and opposite-sex parents, see Angela 
Onwuachi-Willig & Jacob Willig-Onwuachi, A House Divided: The Invisibility of the Multiracial 
Family, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 231, 236 (2009). There may be some children within ―no-
protection states‖ who may receive benefits because their parents have managed to obtain a second-
parent adoption from a lower court, however, it may be subjected to the same fate as Boseman should 
a higher court strike down such adoptions as void. See infra notes 24–34 and accompanying text. 
 17. Despite a long tradition of discrimination against nonmarital children, it escaped 
constitutional review until 1968. See John C. Gray, Jr. & David Rudovsky, The Court Acknowledges 
the Illegitimate: Levy v. Louisiana and Glona v. American Guarantee & Liability Insurance Co., 118 
U. PA. L. REV. 1, 1–2 (1969).  
 18. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 579 (2003). 
 19. See Sarah Wildman, Children Speak for Same-Sex Marriage, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 20, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/21/fashion/21kids.html. COLAGE is probably the most well-known 
organization focusing exclusively on the needs and interests of children of LGBT parents. See 
generally COLAGE: PEOPLE WITH A LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL, TRANSGENDER, OR QUEER PARENT, 
http://www.colage.org/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2012); James G. Dwyer, Children’s Interests in a Family 
Context—A Cautionary Note, 39 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1053 (1999).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol90/iss6/2
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practices.
20
 In Part II, the case is made plain that children of same-sex 
parents in ―no-protection‖ states—states that offer no state-wide legal 
avenues to a child to create a legal relationship to their non-biological 
parent
21—are treated differently than their opposite-sex parented peers, 
both married and unmarried, and delineates how this disparate treatment 
serves as the basis for an equal protection challenge. Part III lays out the 
nonmarital status jurisprudence and explains why the disparate treatment 
of children of same-sex parents warrants intermediate scrutiny. Parts IV 
and V address likely state justifications centered on moral family 
preservation arguments and those that may hinge on government-based 
administrative efficiency arguments. Part V concludes by offering 
potential state options to avoid the maintenance of an ―insurmountable 
barrier‖ to children of same-sex couples to access government benefits. 
Part VI offers a brief conclusion. 
II. THE LEGAL EXCLUSION OF CHILDREN OF SAME-SEX PARENTS 
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides 
that ―[n]o State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws.‖22 The equal protection mandate ―is 
 
 
 20. This Article is not advocating same-sex marriage as the only possible solution to remedy 
potential constitutional violations. States have a number of channels through which they can establish 
access to the legal system for children of same-sex parents that would place those children on equal 
footing with children of opposite-sex parents. The vast majority of federal and state courts that have 
addressed the constitutionality of laws that deny civil marriages to same-sex couples have applied a 
rational basis level of Equal Protection review. See, e.g., Goodridge v. Dep‘t of Pub. Health, 798 
N.E.2d 941, 960 n.20 (Mass. 2003) (rational basis review, but not ―toothless‖); In re Marriage of J.B. 
and H.B., 326 S.W.3d 654, 681 (Tex. Ct. App. 2010). A few state courts, however, have applied 
heightened review. See Kerrigan v. Comm‘n of Pub. Health, 957 A. 2d 407, 482 (Conn. 2008) 
(holding that law classifying on basis of sexual orientation, a quasi-suspect class, failed to meet 
constitutional muster under intermediate scrutiny); Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 67 (Haw. 1993) 
(applying strict scrutiny); Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 863, 896–904 (Iowa 2009) (applying 
intermediate scrutiny to same-sex marriage ban). For a normative discussion of how states can 
equalize access to the legal system and mitigate the disparate treatment of children of same-sex 
couples by focusing on solutions within the current two-parent paradigm, see Catherine E. Smith, 
Equal Protection for Children of Gay and Lesbian Parents: Challenging the Three Pillars of 
Exclusion—Legitimacy, Dual-Gender Parenting, and Biology, 28 LAW & INEQ. 307, 311 (2010). 
 21. This category of states include jurisdictions where same-sex couples are obtaining second-
parent adoptions from lower courts and the highest court has not decided the issue yet. I have decided 
to place these states in this category because the legal status of those relationships are uncertain and 
subject to being void should the state‘s highest court (or legislature) decide to reverse those lower 
court decisions. See, e.g., Boseman v. Jarrell, 704 S.E.2d 494 (N.C. 2010). 
 22. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Equal Protection Clause is binding on the federal 
government via the Fifth Amendment‘s Due Process Clause. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 
(1954); see also Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n.2 (1975) (explaining that the Court 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated 
alike.‖23 As the next section explains, ―no-protection‖ states treat children 
of same-sex parents differently than their opposite-sex parented peers. In 
these states, it is impossible for a child of same-sex parents to establish a 
legal relationship to a non-biological same-sex parent. The example of 
Boseman v. Jarrell
24
 is illustrative. 
In 2002 in Raleigh, North Carolina, ―John‖ Jarrell-Boseman was born 
to Melissa Jarrell and Julia Boseman. John called Melissa ―Mommy‖ and 
Julia ―Mom.‖25 From the early stages of Melissa and Julia‘s courtship, 
they discussed the prospect of having children.
26
 They eventually moved 
in together and shared a home for two years before beginning the process 
of having John.
27
 They jointly decided that Melissa would be the birth 
mother, and, together, they selected the anonymous sperm donor, and 
attended the medical appointments, the insemination and the post-
conception follow-up visits.
28
 Julia also assisted with Melissa‘s pre-natal 
care, including reading to John ―in the womb and play[ing] music for 
him.‖29 After he was born, John was baptized at Julia‘s church where both 
―Mom‖ and ―Mommy‖ held themselves out in front of their friends and 
families as his parents.
30
  
Although same-sex marriage is prohibited in North Carolina, at the 
time John was born, a number of sympathetic lower court judges did grant 
second-parent adoptions to gay and lesbian couples. When John was two, 
a trial court in Durham County made him Julia‘s legally adopted child.31 
His entire life, John knew Julia and Melissa as his parents and ―show[ed] 
lots of love and respect‖ for both of them.32 After a contentious split 
between Melissa and Julia, the North Carolina Supreme Court ruled that 
the adoption creating eight-year-old John‘s child-parent relationship to 
Julia was ―void ab initio and that [she] is not a legally recognized parent 
 
 
has always treated ―Fifth Amendment equal protection claims . . . precisely the same as . . . equal 
protection claims under the Fourteenth Amendment‖). 
 23. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). 
 24. 704 S.E.2d 494 (N.C. 2010). 
 25. Id. at 497 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 26. Id. at 496–97. 
 27. Id. at 497. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 497–98. 
 32. Id. at 497 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol90/iss6/2
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of [him].‖33 The court refused to recognize two women as John‘s legal 
parents. 
The Boseman decision rendered John‘s relationship with Julia legally 
meaningless.
34
 John, and hundreds of other children with same-sex 
parents, instantaneously lost a legal parent. The ruling voided the legal 
relationships between those children and their non-biological same-sex 
parents who previously had been granted adoptions, including those with 
parents who remained a harmonious couple.
35
 The severance of those 
legally cognizable relationships also precludes John, and children like him, 
from securing a host of legal benefits and rights, such as inheriting through 
intestate succession, from their non-biological same-sex parent. 
Surprisingly to many people who assume that gays and lesbians live in 
more liberal states, Mississippi, South Dakota, Alaska, South Carolina, 
Louisiana, Alabama, Texas, Utah, and Arizona have the largest 
concentrations of children with same-sex parents.
36
 Unfortunately, these 
states are similar to North Carolina in that they offer no statewide legal 
protections for children in same-sex families (or their parents).
37
 
A sizable number of ―no-protection‖ states erect a legal blockade—an 
insurmountable barrier—to the creation of a legal relationship between a 
child and his or her non-biological same-sex parent.
38
 This legal blockade 
results in the child‘s exclusion from significant rights and benefits that 
other children enjoy.
39
 These states serve as ideal jurisdictions to pursue an 
 
 
 33. Id. at. 505. 
 34. Id. 
 35. See Nancy Polikoff, Second-parent adoption no longer available in North Carolina, but 
nonbio mom can obtain custody; all previously granted adoptions void, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND 
GAY) MARRIAGE (Dec. 21, 2010), http://beyondstraightandgaymarriage.blogspot.com/2010/12/second 
-parent-adoption-no-longer.html. The Boseman decision also precludes any future same-sex adoptions 
absent legislative action. See Boseman, 704 S.E.2d at 505. 
 36. See Brower, supra note 11, at 19; Gates & Ost, supra note 11, at 46. 
 37. See Brower, supra note 11, at 19. Some of these jurisdictions may have trial courts that have 
issued second-parent adoptions. See NAT‘L CTR. FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS, Adoption by LGBT Parents, 
http://www.nclrights.org/site/DocServer/2PA_state_list.pdf. 
 38. See Silverman, supra note 2, at 429 (―Even though both partners collaboratively decided to 
have a child . . . in the eyes of the law the non-biological parent is deemed a ‗legal stranger‘ to the 
child.‖). 
 39. Limited or ―no-protection‖ states include Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Florida, Idaho, Indiana, 
Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Missouri, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, North Carolina, North 
Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, West 
Virginia, and Wyoming. NAT‘L CTR. FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS, supra note 37. 
 For a comprehensive overview of state laws prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation, see Maps of State Laws & Policies, HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, http://www.hrc.org/ 
resources/entry/maps-of-state-laws-policies (last visited Mar. 25, 2012). Although this Article focuses 
on ―no-protection‖ states, the arguments herein may be applicable in states that offer some protections 
for gays and lesbians and their families.  
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1598 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 90:1589 
 
 
 
 
equal protection challenge on behalf of a child denied basic government 
benefits simply because the child‘s parents are an unmarried same-sex 
couple. 
Some scholars and jurists argue that treating children of same-sex 
couples differently makes sense because only opposite-sex couples can 
produce a biological offspring that is DNA-related to both parents, and 
marriage is the institution that ―completes‖ the union between man, 
woman, and child. With closer scrutiny, however, it is clear that neither 
biology nor marriage is sacrosanct in decisions about legal parentage 
determinations. Rarely is marriage, biology, or any other consideration the 
sole criterion. More often than not, the determination of who is a legal 
parent is constructed by law to serve what the state purports to be in the 
best economic and psychological interest of the family unit and the 
children within the unit.
40
 This Article argues that, when the well-being of 
children and the family unit are articulated as reasons to develop legal 
relationships between children and parents, the government cannot treat 
some children differently based on the moral view of the parents‘ 
relationship without running afoul of the equal protection of laws. 
A. The Legal Construction of Parenthood 
Children of opposite-sex parents obtain legal relationships with their 
parents through a number of legal channels, including marriage, biology, 
and adoption.
41
 The predominant belief is that the primary source of 
establishing a parent-child relationship is through marriage, and, although 
it is not the only way, it certainly is the most legally beneficial to 
children.
42
 The legal relationship established between a child born within a 
marriage and the child‘s opposite-sex parents is derived automatically and 
is rarely questioned.
43
 The child of married parents, whether the child is 
biologically related to both of them or not, is entitled to an expansive 
 
 
 40. See Alice Ristroph & Melissa Murray, Disestablishing the Family, 119 YALE L.J. 1236, 
1258–72 (2010). 
 41. This Article focuses on potential equal protection claims brought by children who were born 
to same-sex couples, children whose same-sex parents planned to parent them from birth. Notably, 
children whose same-sex parents chose to co-parent after the child‘s birth may have valid equal 
protection claims under a state‘s stepparentage laws. 
 42. See June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Marriage, Parentage, and Child Support, 45 FAM. L.Q. 
219, 221–22 (2011); for a detailed discussion on parentage see Courtney Joslin, Marriage, Biology, 
and Federal Benefits, 98 IOWA L. REV. 1480 (2012); Courtney Joslin, Protecting Children(?): 
Marriage, Gender, and Assisted Reproductive Technology, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 1177 (2010). 
 43. But see discussion in Paula Roberts, Truth and Consequences: Part II. Questioning the 
Paternity of Marital Children, 37 FAM. L.Q. 55 (2003). 
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catalogue of rights and benefits from private and public institutions, 
simply by virtue of the child‘s birth to his or her married parents. As will 
be discussed later, these benefits include financial support, state health 
insurance, social security, workers‘ compensation, wrongful death 
recovery, and other privileges and benefits.
44
 
As for children of unmarried opposite-sex parents, the primary way to 
secure the rights and benefits equal to those of children born to married 
children is through biology. Opposite-sex unmarried parents are presumed 
to be responsible for their children and may establish a legal relationship 
with their child through a number of state sanctioned mechanisms. The 
mother-child biological connection, and thus the legal relationship, is 
easily established. It is determining the biological connection to the father 
that requires affirmative steps on the part of the father or child, and this is 
the subject of most legislative and judicial actions and decisions about 
legal parentage and government benefits. In most states, a biological father 
can acknowledge paternity in a number of ways.
45
 If paternity has never 
been established by the father or has been contested by him (or third 
parties) in some manner, the child may pursue a paternity action to 
establish a legal relationship to his or her biological father in order to seek 
the same rights and benefits of married children.
46
 In every state, there are 
well-established procedures for children of unmarried opposite-sex parents 
to create a legal relationship with their fathers in reliance on proof of 
paternity.
47
 
In every state, unmarried opposite-sex couples may also establish a 
legal parent-child relationship through a simple mechanism available at 
the hospital immediately before or after the birth of the child. A voluntary 
acknowledgment of paternity (VAP), a part of the federal child support 
enforcement statute, requires each state to establish such a process to 
identify fathers.
48
 An unmarried couple may sign an affidavit that 
voluntarily acknowledges that the male signing the form is the father of 
the child.
49
 Although some VAP forms require that the parents believe that 
 
 
 44. See Cynthia R. Mabry, Who is the Baby’s Daddy (and Why is it Important for the Child to 
Know)?, 34 U. BALT. L. REV. 211, 233–34 (2004). 
 45. See James Lockhart, Cause of Action on Behalf of Child or Mother to Establish Paternity, 6 
CAUSES OF ACTION 2d 1 (originally published 1994, updated Mar. 2013). 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. See Julia Saladino, Is a Second Mommy a Good Enough Second Parent?: Why Voluntary 
Acknowledgments of Paternity Should be Available to Lesbian Co-Parents, 7 MOD. AM. 2, 2 (2011).  
 49. Id. at 3. 
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the father is the biological father, many do not.
50
 Even in states that require 
some belief of a biological connection, there is no independent verification 
of the biological link.
51
 
Despite the moral and cultural prioritization of both marriage (and its 
underlying assumptions of monogamy, fertility, and biological link to 
offspring) and biology, they do not serve as the sole determinants of who 
may be a legal parent.
52
 States often address the ways in which individual 
behaviors, qualities, and characteristics do not necessarily reflect the 
state‘s own optimal routing—first courtship, then marriage, and then 
children. 
Often, and more increasingly, a gap exists between state marriage and 
child rearing priorities and the reality of when people actually have 
children.
53
 In an attempt to align (or realign) the reality with the explicit 
marriage priority, states enact law and policy based on what is perceived 
to be in the best interest of children and the family unit, irrespective of 
biology. A primary example of such alignment is the legal fiction of the 
marital presumption rule. In the majority of states, particularly ―no-
protection‖ states, a child born into a marriage is presumed to be the legal 
child of the husband, even if the husband is not the child‘s biological 
father.
54
 To avoid undermining the ―integrity of the family,‖ states 
presume that the husband is the father of the child born into a married 
household, even when the child is, in fact, the biological offspring of 
 
 
 50. Id. 
 51. For further discussion about VAPs, see Leslie Joan Harris, Voluntary Acknowledgments of 
Parentage for Same-Sex Couples, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL‘Y & L. 467 (2012). 
 52. See Ristroph & Murray, supra note 40, at 1251–70; David D. Meyer, Parenthood in a Time 
of Transition: Tensions Between Legal, Biological, and Social Conceptions of Parenthood, 54 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 125, 126 (2006) (―Biology is increasingly called upon to share its privileged status as the 
foundation stone of parenthood with caregiving and other social values.‖); Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 
248, 261 (1983) (finding that a biological link, by itself, does not merit ―substantial protection‖ under 
the Due Process Clause in the way that demonstrating a full commitment to the responsibilities of 
parenthood and child-rearing would); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255–56 (1978) (denying a 
biological father‘s due process challenge to the mother‘s adoption of his child).  
 53. Brady E. Hamilton, Joyce A. Martin & Stephanie J. Ventura, Births: Preliminary Data for 
2010, 60 NAT‘L VITAL STATISTICS REPORTS 2, 4 (2011), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/ 
nvsr/nvsr60/nvsr60_02.pdf (47.7% of births in 2010 were to unmarried women). 
 54. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (holding, in pertinent part, that California‘s 
marital presumption statute did not violate a putative natural father‘s procedural or substantive due 
process rights or the involved child‘s equal protection rights, where the putative natural father 
submitted to the court a paternity test indicating a 98.07% probability of paternity and evidence of a 
parent-like relationship with the child; also holding that the law did not violate the child‘s equal 
protection rights); Jennifer L. Rosato, Children of Same-Sex Parents Deserve the Security Blanket of 
the Parentage Presumption, 44 FAM. CT. REV. 74, 75–76 (2006) (comparing the rights afforded 
children of heterosexual married couples to those afforded children of same-sex couples). 
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another man from the wife‘s adulterous affair.
55
 This presumption also 
applies in many states where opposite-sex couples use a sperm donor due 
to the husband‘s low sperm count or sterility.
56
 In other words, a child 
born to a married couple through another sperm provider is presumed to 
be a child of the marriage.
57
 
Opposite-sex married couples may also establish a legal parent-child 
relationship through adoption. They may adopt a child that is not 
biologically related to either one of them. The opposite-sex couple must 
prove their intent to parent the child, and complete the state-required steps 
of adoption in order to establish a legal relationship to the child. The legal 
relationship is imbued with the same parental obligations, rights, and 
benefits of a child biologically related to his or her parents, or a child born 
into a marriage.
58
 As the modern U.S. family changes, it is clear that 
―[b]iology is increasingly called upon to share its privileged status as the 
foundation stone of parenthood with caregiving and other social values.‖59 
This section is not intended to be an exhaustive treatment of opposite-sex 
family formation, but rather makes the point that, in order to protect the 
rights and interests of children within an opposite-sex relationship, states 
legally construct the parent-child relationship by purportedly focusing on 
the well-being of the child and the basic safety nets and protections within 
a family structure.
60
 States do not make determinations based on a single 
factor of the marriage of the parents, a biological connection to parents, or 
parental intent. 
Yet, in ―no-protection‖ states, the interests of children (and the family 
unit) in same-sex families are ignored.
61
 While opposite-sex parents and 
their children may establish legal relationships to one another through 
marriage, biology, adoption, and other state-created channels, those 
 
 
 55. Rosato, supra note 54, at 75 n.16. 
 56. Id. at 75. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Utah allows only legally married couples to jointly adopt. See Child Welfare Info. Gateway, 
Who May Adopt, Be Adopted, or Place a Child for Adoption?, CHILDREN‘S BUREAU 32 (2012), 
http://www.childwelfare.gov/systemwide/laws_policies/statutes/parties.pdf.  
 59. Meyer, supra note 52, at 126. See also Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 261 (finding that a 
biological link, by itself, does not merit ―substantial protection‖ under the Due Process Clause in the 
way that demonstrating a full commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood and child-rearing 
would); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255–56 (1978) (denying a biological father‘s due process 
challenge to the mother‘s adoption of his child). For a discussion of the de-emphasis of a biological 
connection as a requisite to legal familial association, see Ristroph & Murray, supra note 40, at 51–72. 
 60. In some situations, individuals may acquire some rights and responsibilities as to children as 
de facto parents. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 257.025 (2008) (granting custody rights to individuals 
including stepparents and de facto parents when in the ―best interests of the child‖). 
 61. Rosato, supra note 54, at 75. 
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avenues remain closed to same-sex parents and their children.
62
 Although 
biology establishes the legal link between the child and its same-sex birth 
mother (or father through surrogacy), it is impossible for the non-
biological same-sex parent to establish a legal relationship to the child: 
same-sex couples cannot marry;
63
 the same-sex non-biological parent is 
not related by blood; gay and lesbian couples cannot adopt;
64
 and there is 
no alternative legal mechanism for a same-sex non-biological parent to 
voluntarily acknowledge or demonstrate an intent to parent their same-sex 
partner‘s biological child. It is also impossible for the child to 
independently obtain a legal relationship to the non-biological same-sex 
parent.
65
 
As the next part explains, the failure of ―no-protection‖ states to 
establish legal channels for children of same-sex parents to create a legally 
recognized relationship to their non-biological parent ensures that they 
will be denied countless state and federal benefits designed to provide 
basic financial safety nets and facilitate the transfer of wealth.
66
 These 
insurmountable barriers to establishing a legal relationship assure that 
children of same-sex parents exist as a subset of nonmarital children who 
can never be placed on an equal footing with marital children.  
 
 
 62. Melanie B. Jacobs, Micah Has One Mommy and One Legal Stranger: Adjudicating 
Maternity for Nonbiological Lesbian Coparents, 50 BUFF. L. REV. 341, 344–47 (2002). Some states 
allow gay and lesbian parents to form a legally recognized relationship with a non-biological child. See 
Polikoff, supra note 10, at 586 (asserting that parentage determinations ―have become available in 
many states through adoption decrees, orders of parentage, and, to a lesser extent, through the use of 
equitable doctrine conferring some, if not all, of the indicia of parenthood‖). 
 63. In the vast majority of states, a child‘s same-sex parents cannot marry one another; only six 
states and the District of Columbia allow same-sex couples to marry, and eleven other states allow 
civil unions. See Interstate Relationship Recognition, HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN (May 27, 2011), 
http://www.hrc.org/files/assets/resources/Interstate_Relationships_Recognition_Map(1).pdf. 
 64. Eighteen states and the District of Columbia allow second-parent adoptions, permitting non-
biological same-sex parent to legally adopt their partner‘s child. See Parenting Laws: Second Parent 
Adoption, HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN (Jan. 18, 2011), http://www.hrc.org/files/images/general/2nd_ 
Parent_Adoption.pdf. In eight other states, same-sex families have been successful in obtaining 
second-parent adoptions in some jurisdictions. Id. Mississippi is the only state with an unchallenged 
ban on gay and lesbian adoptions. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-13-3(5) (West 2012). 
 65. Regardless of whether state level protections exist, children of LGBT parents are still at a 
comparative disadvantage and must navigate a ―patchwork quilt‖ of laws to obtain a legal relationship 
with their non-biological same-sex parent. Rosato, supra note 54, at 75–76. 
 66. A child‘s non-biological same-sex parent is also denied rights and benefits as a result of the 
lack of legal relationship with the child. For a more comprehensive discussion and list of rights, 
benefits, and privileges denied such same-sex parents, see Graham, supra note 8, at 1034–37; Sam 
Castic, The Irrationality of a Rational Basis: Denying Benefits to the Children of Same-Sex Couples, 3 
MOD. AM. 3, 4–6 (2007); Jeffrey G. Gibson, Lesbian and Gay Prospective Adoptive Parents: The 
Legal Battle, 26 HUM. RTS. 7, 7–11 (1999); Rosato, supra note 54, at 75–76. 
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B. The State Benefits Denied Children of Same-Sex Parents 
As the previous section demonstrated, a majority of children with 
same-sex parents live in ―no-protection‖ states in which the non-biological 
parent and child are precluded from forming a legal relationship. This 
legal barricade results in the blatant exclusion of these children from the 
rights, benefits, and privileges exercised by children of opposite-sex 
parents.
67
 Children of same-sex couples are denied benefits offered by 
both public and private institutions; this section, however, focuses 
primarily on those denied by government—especially state government—
actors. There is only one reported case of a benefit denial for social 
security benefits, as will be discussed subsequently.
68
 This section 
documents a list of state benefits that are subject to a denial of recovery for 
children of same-sex parents, and, therefore, are ripe for an equal 
protection challenge.
69
 
1. State Benefits 
Workers‘ Compensation Workers‘ compensation schemes provide 
benefits to employees injured or killed in the workplace.
70
 Although each 
state is different, most provide benefits for ―dependents‖ of employees 
protected under the statute.
71
 The definition of dependent in ―no-
protection‖ states does not include the child of a non-biological same-sex 
parent.
72
 Although the child may, in fact, be dependent upon the non-
 
 
 67. For a list of benefits and privileges to which children of opposite-sex parents are entitled but 
to which children of same-sex parents are denied, see Castic, supra note 66, at 4–6; John F. Coverdale, 
Missing Persons: Children in the Tax Treatment of Marriage, 48 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 475, 504–06 
(1998). 
 68. See infra Part II.B.2.  
 69. The author can only speculate as to why there is no record of equal protection challenges that 
have been brought by or on behalf of children in this context. It is likely that in the near future a child 
will be denied a benefit and seek to challenge its constitutionality.  
 70. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 97-3 (West 1973) (All employers and employees are 
―respectively to pay and accept compensation for personal injury or death by accident arising out of 
and in the course of his employment . . . .‖). 
 71. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 97-39 (West 1973) (―The widow, or widower and all 
children of deceased employees [are] conclusively presumed to be dependents of deceased and [are] 
entitled to receive the benefits of [compensation] . . . .‖). 
 72. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-1-70 (1985) (―‗child‘ shall include a posthumous child, a child 
legally adopted prior to the injury of the employee and a stepchild or acknowledged illegitimate child 
dependent upon the deceased, but does not include married children unless wholly dependent . . . .‖); 
ALA. CODE § 25-5-1 (1975) (―child‖ or ―children‖ means ―posthumous children and all other children 
entitled by law to inherit as children of the deceased; stepchildren who were members of the family of 
the deceased, at the time of the accident, and were dependent upon him or her for support . . . .‖). 
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biological same-sex parent‘s income at the time the parent is injured or 
killed on the job, the child is prohibited from recovery.
73
  
Inheritance When an individual dies without a will, the person‘s 
property is distributed by the state under an intestacy scheme. For 
opposite-sex married couples, an intestate‘s spouse and legally recognized 
children are entitled to some portion of the estate.
74
 In ―no-protection‖ 
states, same-sex couples and their children are not recognized under this 
scheme.
75
 Neither the same-sex partner nor the child of the same-sex 
partner is legally recognized under the probate laws; both will be denied 
the proceeds of the decedent‘s estate, despite the fact that they are the 
decedent‘s immediate ―family members.‖ Instead, the proceeds of the 
estate will go to those legally recognized in the probate code, after spouses 
and children. Most probate codes then distribute the proceeds of the estate 
to the parents and siblings of the person who has died. The child will be 
denied inheritance to their non-biological parent‘s estate even if the 
decedent intended for the child to inherit from her estate.
76
 
Support, Custody, and Visitation In ―no-protection‖ states, there are no 
statewide avenues for the non-biological parent or the child to obtain the 
corresponding right or obligation to child support, custody, or visitation.
77
 
Child support is reserved for recognized legal parents of a child. ―This has 
the effect of removing from the child the very source of funds that may 
have supported the child for a considerable period of time, especially if the 
‗non-biological‘ parent was the primary wage earner in the household.‖78 
As for custody and visitation, the non-biological parent is viewed as a 
legal stranger and, therefore, has no standing to seek custody of the child 
or visitation. Further, the child also has no legal recourse to develop a 
relationship with the non-biological parent.
79
 Another complexity of 
 
 
 73. Some states permit recovery based on dependency, as opposed to marriage or blood relation. 
See Nancy D. Polikoff, Law that Values All Families: Beyond (Straight and Gay) Marriage, 22 J. AM. 
ACAD. MATRIMONIAL L. 85, 97–100 (2009).  
 74. Lee-ford Tritt, Sperms and Estates: An Unadulterated Functionally Based Approach to 
Parent-Child Property Succession, 62 SMU L. REV. 367, 380–81 (2009). 
 75. Id. at 382 (explaining that intestacy statutes use formal definitions to define the parent-child 
relationship that exclude functional parents). 
 76. See id. at 408–10. 
 77. Some of these states may have some lower court decisions that are an exception to this rule. 
See COURTNEY JOSLIN & SHANNON MINTER, LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL, AND TRANSGENDER FAMILY 
LAW (2d ed. 2012). 
 78. Silverman, supra note 2, at 447. See also Castic, supra note 66, at 6. 
 79. See Silverman, supra note 2, at 448; Ledsham, supra note 10, at 2375; Sporleder v. Hermes, 
471 N.W.2d 202 (Wis. 1991) (holding that a woman who sought custody and visitation of the 
biological son of her former partner of eight years, whom the plaintiff had adopted, had no legal 
standing for any claims).  
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custody, support, and visitation rights arises if the biological parent dies. 
The same-sex non-biological parent may be denied custody, and even 
visitation, if a third party family member seeks legal custody of the child.
80
 
Wrongful Death Wrongful death claims focus primarily on pecuniary 
(economic) loss to the plaintiff from the negligent, reckless, or intentional 
death of a loved one.
81
 Increasingly, states allow parties to recover for 
their emotional suffering from the loss of a loved one as well.
82
 Although 
the list of eligible plaintiffs varies by state, most limit wrongful death 
recovery to the deceased‘s spouse, children, parents, or siblings.83 
Therefore, a child of a non-biological same-sex parent would not fit within 
the statutory definition of a person entitled to file suit for her losses 
resulting from the parent‘s death caused by a negligent, reckless, or 
intentional actor. The defendant in a potential lawsuit is granted a windfall 
when they cause the death of a non-biological same-sex parent, because 
the child is precluded from seeking recovery.  
Bystander Recovery Most states allow a person to recover emotional 
harm damages when they witness the serious bodily injury or death of a 
family member caused by a defendant‘s negligent or reckless conduct.84 In 
order to limit the number of people who may recover under a bystander 
claim, state statutes and courts only permit claims by bystanders who are 
the spouse, legal child, or parent of the injured party. A child of a non-
biological same-sex parent does not fall within the definition of a legal 
child of the injured party. 
Civil Service A child whose non-biological same-sex parent works for 
the state is denied a laundry list of benefits that children of opposite-sex 
 
 
 80. See Theresa Glennon, Binding the Family Ties: A Child Advocacy Perspective on Second-
Parent Adoptions, 7 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 255, 258–260 (1998); CHILDREN MATTER 
REPORT, supra note 12, at 48 (After fatal accident kills bio mother of five year old boy, West Virginia 
Supreme Court affirms reversal of lower court decision denying surviving non-bio mother custody). 
 81. For further explanation of wrongful death statutes and the limitations therein, see John G. 
Culhane, A “Clanging Silence”: Same-Sex Couples and Tort Law, 89 KY. L.J. 911, 953–59 (2001); 
Andrew J. McClurg, Dead Sorrow: A Story About Loss and a New Theory of Wrongful Death 
Damages, 85 B.U. L. REV. 1 (2005). 
 82. See, e.g., Green v. Bittner, 424 A.2d 210, 216 (N.J. 1980) (―[W]e know of no public policy 
which would prohibit awarding damages that fully compensate . . . for the emotional suffering caused 
by the [wrongful] death.‖). 
 83. In addition to denying recovery to a child that is not a ―child‖ in the eyes of a given state‘s 
law, these statutory limitations also prevent recovery by family members not falling into the traditional 
nuclear family. See Culhane, supra note 81, at 942–63. 
 84. See Meredith E. Green, Who Knows Where the Love Grows?: Unmarried Cohabitants and 
Bystander Recovery for Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1093, 
1094–96 (2009). 
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parents obtain, including medical and dental benefits,
85
 life insurance, and 
the presence of their non-biological parent for parental and family leave.
86
  
2. Social Security and Federal Benefits Dependent on State 
Definitions of Legal Parentage 
In addition to state benefits, children of same-sex parents in non-
marriage equality states are also denied federal benefits that hinge on the 
state definition of marriage and legal parentage, the most significant being 
social security.
87
 
Under the Social Security Act, a dependent child may receive monthly 
Child Insurance Benefits (CIB) of a wage earner who retires, suffers a 
disability, or dies.
88
 The determination of who may recover relies on the 
state definition of ―natural child,‖ which in ―no-protection‖ states excludes 
children as it relates to the non-biological same-sex parent.
89
 In one of the 
few reported cases of an actual benefit denial to a child of same-sex 
parents, Nicolaj Caracappa was refused federal social security benefits 
because his non-biological mother was not recognized as a legal parent. 
Although New Jersey then offered second-parent adoption and the couple 
failed to obtain one, the case demonstrates the actual economic injury that 
can occur to a child. 
 
 
 85. See Phillips v. Wis. Pers. Comm‘n, 482 N.W.2d 121 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992) (upholding lower 
court‘s dismissal of state employee‘s employment discrimination complaint, which was filed following 
denial of the employee‘s application for family health insurance coverage for her female partner, 
holding that limiting dependent health insurance coverage to employees‘ spouses and children doesn‘t 
violate marital status, sexual orientation, or gender provisions of the Wisconsin Fair Employment Act); 
Hinman v. Dep‘t of Pers. Admin., 167 Cal. App. 3d 516 (1985); Silverman, supra note 2, at 443. 
 86. See, e.g., Goodridge v. Dep‘t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 956–57 (Mass. 2003) (listing 
state benefits of marriage, including many that extend to children); id. at 956–57 (―the fact remains 
that marital children reap a measure of family stability and economic security based on their parents‘ 
legally privileged status that is largely inaccessible, or not as readily accessible, to nonmarital 
children.‖). 
 87. In light of the Supreme Court‘s ruling in United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 786 (2012), 
children in marriage equality states are now eligible for both state and federal benefits. There are a 
host of federal benefits that a child of same-sex parents in non-marriage states may be denied, 
including social security, welfare benefits, family medical leave, tax, and rights under immigration 
law. See Castic, supra note 66, at 4–6. Windsor was decided as this Article moved to publication. For a 
more complete discussion of Windsor and its effects, see Catherine E. Smith, Windsor’s Progeny 
(forthcoming) (on file with author).  
 88. See Robert E. Rains, DOMA and the Social Security Act: An Odd Couple Begetting 
Disfavored Children, 55 ST. LOUIS. U. L.J. 811 (2011). 
 89. See id. at 847–49. 
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In March 1998, Nicolaj Caracappa was born to Eva Kadray and 
Camille Caracappa.
90
 At the time, New Jersey did not allow same-sex 
marriage or civil unions. After several years in a committed relationship, 
Eva and Camille planned for and participated in the alternative 
insemination, pre-natal care, birth and child-rearing of Nicolaj.
91
 Eva was 
the biological mother of Nicolaj, and she and Camille agreed that Eva 
would stay home with their child, while Camille worked as their sole 
financial provider as an oncology nurse.
92
 Eva and Camille lived together, 
jointly owned their home, commingled their finances, and shared joint 
bank accounts.
93
 They gave Nicolaj Camille‘s last name and baptized him 
as his parents in their Catholic Church. Although second parent adoption 
was available in New Jersey, the couple decided to wait on an adoption 
until their second child was born, so that they could do both adoptions 
together. Tragically, Camille died of a brain aneurysm before the adoption 
of Nicolaj could be completed. Despite the fact that Nicolaj was 
financially dependent on his non-biological mother, Camille Caracappa, 
an administrative law judge denied the request for social security benefits 
because the record did not contain evidence of a valid marriage or 
documentation that Nicolaj is the ―natural/biological‖ child of Camille 
Caracappa.
94
 The judge ultimately concluded that ―Nicolaj S. Caracappa is 
not the ‗child of‘ the deceased insured wage earner, Camille Caracappa, as 
that term is defined in . . . the Social Security Act and Regulations . . . .‖95 
It was clear that they viewed themselves as a family and that she intended 
to allow Nicolaj to recover based on her years of hard work and payment 
of taxes. Significantly, in ―no-protection‖ states, children of same-sex 
parents would have absolutely no recourse because these states do not 
allow any legal channel to a legal relationship.
96
 In addition to social 
security, the child‘s family may also be denied welfare benefits and other 
federal rights.
97
 
 
 
 90. Nicolaj Sikes Caracappa, Soc. Sec. Admin. Off. (Mar. 30, 2004) (finding ―Nicolaj S. 
Caracappa is not the ‗child of‘ the deceased insured wage earner, Camille Caracappa, as that term is 
defined in . . . the Social Security Act and Regulations . . . .‖). 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 5. 
 94. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 95. Id. 
 96. Recovery appears promising for children in states that allow same-sex marriage and adoption 
by same-sex couples, where their parent(s) take advantage of those legal options. See Rains, supra 
note 88, at 849–51. 
 97. See CHILDREN MATTER REPORT, supra note 12, at 57–59; Catherine Smith, Queer as Black 
Folk?, 2007 WIS. L. REV. 379, 402–07 (2007). 
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This section offers merely a brief list of benefits that children of same-
sex parents are denied. The individual and collective denial of government 
benefits to children of same-sex parents has detrimental economic 
consequences on them to which children of married opposite-sex parents 
are not subjected, and it is constitutionally suspect based on historical 
precedent—the disparate treatment of nonmarital children. 
III. THE LEGAL EXCLUSION OF CHILDREN OF SAME-SEX PARENTS 
WARRANTS INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY 
More than forty years ago, the United States Supreme Court held that 
government-based distinctions treating nonmarital children differently 
than marital children because of moral disdain of the parents‘ relationships 
were impermissible.
98
 Today, government exclusions of children of same-
sex parents serve as the modern-day equivalent in which states draw 
distinctions on the basis of a child‘s parents‘ nonmarital status to deny 
them equal protection of the laws.
99
 
A. The Equal Protection Law of Nonmarital Children 
The United States has a long history of discrimination against children 
born to unmarried parents. At common law, nonmarital children were 
filius nullius or the ―child of nobody.‖100 By virtue of society‘s moral 
condemnation of their parents‘ conduct, they were denied social and legal 
benefits to which children born to married parents were entitled. They 
were considered non-persons who could not inherit, obtain financial 
parental support, wrongful death recovery, social security, and countless 
other benefits.
101
 They were also subjected to extensive social ostracism.
102
 
The criticism of the legal treatment of nonmarital children began in the 
early 1940s and was eventually swept into the political and legal debates 
 
 
 98. For a brief history of nonmarital children, see KRAUSE, supra note 1, at 1–8. 
 99. For similar arguments, see Debra Carrasquillo Hedges, The Forgotten Children: Same-Sex 
Partners, Their Children and Unequal Treatment, 41 B.C. L. REV. 883, 898–902 (2000); Ledsham, 
supra note 10, at 2378–86. 
 100. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *459 (―rights [of a 
nonmarital child] are very few, being only such as he can acquire; for he can inherit nothing, being 
looked upon as the son of nobody . . . .‖) (emphasis in original); Ledsham, supra note 10, at 2373; 
Gareth W. Cook, Bastards, 47 TEX. L. REV. 326, 327 n.11 (1969). 
 101. See Solangel Maldonado, Illegitimate Harm: Law, Stigma, and Discrimination Against 
Nonmarital Children, 63 FLA. L. REV. 345, 346–47 (2011).  
 102. Id. See also KRAUSE, supra note 1, at 1–8. 
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of the civil rights movement.
103
 In 1944, New York City judge and child 
rights advocate Justine Wise Polier documented the disparate treatment of 
nonmarital children in an article entitled Illegitimacy and the Law, which 
called for legislative action to address their plight.
104
  
In the early 1960s, litigators challenging illegitimacy did not seek a 
child-focused strategy alone but incorporated the unfair treatment of 
nonmarital children as a component of a more expansive civil rights 
agenda. Nonmarital status laws disproportionately impacted African-
American and impoverished children, and therefore seemed like a natural 
subset of a larger race and poverty-based platform.
105
 Professor Martha 
Davis explains that, despite early efforts to remedy discrimination against 
nonmarital children by linking it to the civil rights movement, courts 
―showed little interest in addressing the interrelationships among poverty, 
race, gender, and illegitimacy . . . .‖106 In response, litigators turned to 
framing illegitimacy as a classification itself.
107
 
At the forefront of this movement was Professor Harry D. Krause.
108
 In 
1966, in his article, Equal Protection for the Illegitimate, he documented 
the ways in which children born to unmarried parents were denied private 
and government benefits and urged courts to strike down such statutes as 
violative of the right to equal protection of laws.
109
 He insisted that, 
instead of courts‘ persistent focus on the rights of the parents, ―[i]t [was] 
time that the matter be considered from the standpoint of the child!‖110 In 
 
 
 103. See Martha F. Davis, Male Coverture: Law and the Illegitimate Family, 56 RUTGERS L. REV. 
73, 90 (2003) (asserting that early efforts by lawyers to frame illegitimacy arguments around 
children‘s rights was an effective short-term strategy, but that strategy left unanswered many questions 
about parents‘ rights and perpetuated elements of so-called ―male coverture‖ within the law). 
 104. Id. at 90–91 (citing JUSTINE WISE POLIER, ILLEGITIMACY AND THE LAW 13 (1944) (NOW 
Collection, Box 45, Folder 555, on file with the Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Inst., Harvard Univ.)). 
 105. See Brief for NAACP Legal Defense Fund as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 18 
n.17, Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968); KRAUSE, supra note 1, at 1–8. 
 106. See Davis, supra note 103, at 92 (citing Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972)) 
(explaining the inability of civil rights litigation that is focused on race, gender, and poverty to directly 
address the plight of nonmarital children, due to the Supreme Court‘s refusal to extend heighted 
scrutiny to disparate racial impact of illegitimacy laws). 
 107. Id. (critiquing child-focused strategy because it ignored the familial context of these cases 
and left the door open for laws discriminating against out-of-wedlock parents based on persistent race 
and sex stereotypes).  
 108. See Harry D. Krause, Bringing the Bastard Into The Great Society—A Proposed Uniform Act 
on Legitimacy, 44 TEX. L. REV. 829 (1966); Harry D. Krause, Equal Protection for the Illegitimate, 65 
MICH. L. REV. 477 (1967). 
 109. See Krause, Equal Protection for the Illegitimate, 65 MICH. L. REV. 477 (1967); Davis, supra 
note 103, at 84–89 (delineating the distinctions in rights afforded children born within marriages to 
those born to un-married parents in terms of wrongful death, inheritance, custody, domicile and 
adoption). 
 110. See Krause, supra note 109, at 484. 
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1968, in reliance on a line of racial discrimination cases including 
Korematsu v. United States
111
 and Hirabayashi v. United States,
112
 Krause 
and civil rights lawyer Norman Dorsen advanced their child-oriented 
arguments to the Supreme Court in Levy v. Louisiana,
113
 the first case to 
bring an equal protection challenge on behalf of nonmarital children.
114
 
Louise Levy, an unmarried African American mother with five young 
children, went to a state hospital with dizziness, chest pains, and slowness 
of breath. The attending physician failed to take her blood pressure or 
conduct any tests. A week later, when she returned with worse symptoms, 
the doctor told her that she was not taking her medication and 
recommended a psychiatrist. She died ten days later.
115
 Thelma Levy, 
Louise‘ sister, sued Louisiana on behalf of the Levy children who were 
prohibited from a ―right to recover‖ because they were born outside of 
marriage.
116
 The Louisiana Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court‘s 
dismissal of the children‘s claim on the grounds that they were not 
―legitimate,‖ insofar as ―morals and general welfare . . . discourage[] 
bringing children into the world out of wedlock.‖117 The Supreme Court 
reversed the Louisiana decision.
118
 
The attempts of civil rights advocates to link nonmarital status laws to 
larger forms of social discrimination like race, poverty, and gender, were 
unsuccessful; however, the influence of the civil rights cases was clearly 
present in the early nonmarital status cases.
119
 The rights of nonmarital 
children developed simultaneously with the Supreme Court‘s 
conceptualization of modern equal protection jurisprudence. Levy and the 
 
 
 111. 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
 112. 320 U.S. 81 (1943). 
 113. 391 U.S. 68 (1968). 
 114. See Br. for Appellee at 15, Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) (No. 508), 1968 WL 
112826 (citing Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954)); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 
216 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943) (asserting that ―[d]istinctions 
between citizens solely because of their ancestry are by their very nature odious to a free people whose 
institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality‖); Davis, supra note 103, at 94 (―[Krause] was 
contacted by Adolph Levy, a Louisiana lawyer handling a wrongful death case on behalf of the estate 
of Louise Levy . . . .‖). 
 115. John C. Gray, Jr. & David Rudovsky, The Court Acknowledges the Illegitimate: Levy v. 
Louisiana and Glona v. American Guarantee & Liability Insurance Co., 118 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 2–3 
(1969). 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 3 (quoting Levy v. Louisiana, 192 So. 2d 193, 195 (La. Ct. App. 1967)). The Louisiana 
Supreme Court denied certiorari because it found the Court of Appeals made no error of law. 
 118. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968). 
 119. Laurence C. Nolan, “Unwed Children” and Their Parents Before the United States Supreme 
Court from Levy to Michael H.: Unlikely Participants in Constitutional Jurisprudence, 28 CAP. U. L. 
REV. 1, 26 (1999). 
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early nonmarital status cases were shaped by, and presumably shaped, the 
evolving law on the tiers of scrutiny and the factors that would ultimately 
be deployed to sort different classifications into the assignment-of-rights-
pecking-order that now exists. For example, in striking down the right to 
recover statute, the Levy Court, citing Brown v. Board of Education,
120
 
explained, ―we have been extremely sensitive when it comes to basic civil 
rights and have not hesitated to strike down an invidious classification 
even though it had history and tradition on its side.‖121 The Court 
concluded that Louisiana was driven by invidious discrimination because 
the child‘s status as ―illegitimate‖ had nothing to do with the wrong 
inflicted on the mother.
122
 The child engaged in no action or conduct that 
contributed to the mother‘s injuries.  
In the same year as Levy, the Court decided a companion case, Glona v. 
American Guarantee & Liability Insurance Co.,
123
 in which Minnie Glona 
was denied wrongful death recovery for the death of her son because he 
was born outside of marriage.
124
 Louisiana law required a decedent be 
―legitimate‖ in order for an ascendant, in this case his mother, to recover 
under wrongful death law.
125
 Louisiana argued that it could deal with ―sin‖ 
selectively and was permitted to treat parents of ―illegitimate‖ children 
differently than parents of ―legitimate‖ ones.126 The Supreme Court 
disagreed, reversing the lower court‘s ruling because there was no causal 
connection between the law and the ―sin‖ of having children outside of 
marriage; it was unlikely that women would get pregnant in order to reap 
the benefits of wrongful death recoveries. There was no doubt that Minnie 
Glona was the mother of the child wrongfully killed, and Louisiana could 
not withhold relief because the child was born outside of marriage.
127
 
Further, the Court stated that to allow such claims would result in a 
windfall to tortfeasors.
128
 
 
 
 120. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 121. Levy, 391 U.S. at 71 (internal citations omitted); see also Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 
646 (1948) (―[a]s a general rule, ‗Distinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry are by 
their very nature odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of 
equality.‘‖) (quoting Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943)). 
 122. Levy, 391 U.S. at 72; see also Glona v. Am. Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968) 
(invalidating a Louisiana statute that barred recovery for damages to the mother of an illegitimate 
child, while allowing recovery to the parents of a legitimate child under the Fourteenth Amendment‘s 
Equal Protection Clause); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982). 
 123. 391 U.S. 73 (1968). 
 124. Id. at 73–74. 
 125. Id. at 74–75. 
 126. Id. at 75–76. 
 127. Id. at 76. 
 128. Id. at 75. 
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Three years later in Labine v. Vincent,
129
 the Supreme Court appeared 
to retreat from its stance in Levy and Glona by denying a child born out of 
wedlock inheritance from her father who died without a will.
130
 The 
child‘s mother and father jointly acknowledged before a notary that Rita 
Vincent was their natural child.
131
 However, under Louisiana law, the 
public acknowledgment did not give Rita a legal right to share equally as 
if she were a legitimate child.
132
 The Louisiana trial court‘s decision to 
deny Rita inheritance rights and to award the inheritance to the father‘s 
brothers and sisters was upheld by the Louisiana Court of Appeals.
133
 In 
arguments to the Supreme Court, Rita relied on Levy and Glona, and 
asserted that her exclusion from recovery of a share of her father‘s estate 
was invidious discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection 
Clause.
134
 The Supreme Court rejected her equal protection argument as 
misplaced because, unlike Levy, this was not a situation in which the state 
―created an insurmountable barrier‖ to the nonmarital child.135 With 
limited reference to the equal protection principles previously articulated 
in Levy and Glona, the Labine Court held that Louisiana had the power to 
make laws for the distribution of property, and, within the confines of the 
state law, the father could have legitimated Rita a number of ways, 
including by marrying the mother, formulating a will, or stating his desire 
to legitimate his daughter in an acknowledgment.
136
 The father failed to 
comply with the state‘s basic formalities, and as such, his actions (or 
inactions), not those of the state, resulted in the denial of inheritance.
137
 
While Labine is difficult to align with the equal protection analyses in 
Levy and Glona,
138
 it did articulate a baseline below which government 
could not tread: states cannot create an insurmountable barrier to the father 
or the nonmarital child to establish a legal relationship. A year later in 
 
 
 129. 401 U.S. 532 (1971). 
 130. See id. at 540. 
 131. Id. at 533. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. at 535. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. at 539. In dissent, Justice Brennan pointed out the inconsistency in the ―insurmountable 
barrier‖ position in Labine when compared to the position taken in Levy, which did not involve an 
insurmountable barrier; the plaintiff in Levy could have formally acknowledged her children and 
recovery would have been allowed under Louisiana law. Id. at 550–51 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See 
also Nolan, supra note 119, at 13. 
 136. Labine, 401 U.S. at 539 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see id. at 553 (discussing in depth the 
problem of attaching obligations of husband and wife to those of father to child.). 
 137. Id. at 539. 
 138. JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 14.15–14.16, at 869–
70, 872 (7th ed. 2000).  
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Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., the Supreme Court once again 
expanded the rights of nonmarital children.
139
 
In Weber, the Supreme Court struck down another Louisiana provision 
that awarded workers‘ compensation proceeds to a deceased worker‘s 
children born of his marriage, but denied those same proceeds to children 
born outside of the marriage.
140
 Henry Clyde Stokes died of work-related 
injuries and, at the time of his death, was living with Willie Mae Weber.
141
 
Stokes and Weber were not married but maintained a household of five 
children.
142
 One of the children was born to Stokes and Weber, while four 
others had been born to Stokes and his wife, Adlay Jones, who had 
previously been committed to a mental hospital.
143
 Weber and Stokes‘ 
second child was born shortly after Stokes‘ death.144 
The four marital children filed a workers‘ compensation claim for their 
father‘s death, and Willie Mae Weber claimed compensation benefits on 
behalf of the nonmarital children.
145
 Under Louisiana workers‘ 
compensation law, however, ―unacknowledged illegitimate‖146 children 
were not treated the same as children born to married parents.
147
 They 
were considered ―other dependents‖ entitled to recovery only if surviving 
dependents in line before them did not exhaust the maximum benefits.
148
 
The four children from Stokes‘ marriage were awarded the maximum 
allowable amount, leaving the two children from the nonmarital 
partnership between Stokes and Weber with nothing.
149
 In reversing the 
Louisiana Supreme Court, and again articulating the more expansive 
principles in Levy and Glona, the Weber Court explained that treating 
children born outside of marriage differently than those born inside it is 
impermissible discrimination.
150
 The Weber Court reasoned that ―[a]n 
 
 
 139. 406 U.S. 164 (1972).  
 140. Id. at 175–76. 
 141. Id. at 165. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. at 165–66. 
 146. Id. at 168. It was not possible for Stokes, the father in Weber, to acknowledge his two 
children because Louisiana law prohibited acknowledgment of children whose parents were incapable 
of marrying at the time of conception. At the time of conception, Stokes remained married to Jones, 
making it impossible for him to marry Weber. Id. at 171 n.9. 
 147. Id. at 167–68 (noting that the Louisiana law allowed ―legitimate children and acknowledged 
illegitimates‖ equal recovery, while relegating ―[u]nacknowledged illegitimate children‖ to a lesser 
status). 
 148. Id. at 168. 
 149. Id. at 167. 
 150. Id. at 169. 
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unacknowledged illegitimate child may suffer as much from the loss of a 
parent as a child born within wedlock or an illegitimate later 
acknowledged.‖151 
Weber, the most well-known and cited nonmarital status case, 
reiterated that a state may not place its moral objection of a child‘s 
parents‘ conduct at the feet of the child by withholding government 
benefits. To do so places the child at an economic disadvantage for 
conduct over which the child has no control. Further, this punishment 
speaks of invidious animus as opposed to serving some legitimate 
governmental purpose. Invoking previous concerns of the ―insurmountable 
barrier‖ raised in Labine, the Weber Court found such treatment of 
nonmarital status children to be particularly concerning as ―[t]he burdens 
of illegitimacy, already weighty, become doubly so when neither the 
parent nor child can legally lighten them.‖152 
In an interesting mix of developing civil rights doctrine and the basic 
economic and social protection of children, these early cases laid the 
foundational principles of the law of nonmarital children.
153
 From 1968 to 
1986, the Supreme Court heard more than a dozen cases before explicitly 
holding that classifications treating nonmarital children differently than 
marital children warranted intermediate scrutiny.
154
 The rationales 
articulated in Levy, Glona, Labine, and Weber were part and parcel of 
early civil rights and equal protection jurisprudence and spoke to the 
importance of the social and economic rights unique to children.
155
  
Today, it is well-settled equal protection law that the government may 
not treat children born outside of a marriage differently than those born 
within one without the treatment being subjected to intermediate 
scrutiny.
156
 States are required to place nonmarital children on equal 
footing with marital children unless there is a legitimate justification for 
the unequal treatment.
157
 State statutes and the Uniform Parentage Act 
reflect this equal protection mandate for children of unmarried opposite-
 
 
 151. Id. 
 152. See id. at 171. 
 153. See Nolan, supra note 119, at 36–37. 
 154. See Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 465 (1988) (holding that Pennsylvania statute was 
unconsitutional under intermediate or ―heightened‖ scrutiny). 
 155. See Nolan, supra note 119, at 36–37. 
 156. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 748 (2d ed. 
2002). 
 157. In practice, there continue to be areas in which nonmarital children are not treated identical to 
marital children, such as intestate succession, citizenship, and financial support. See Maldonado, supra 
note 101, at 349 (―This Article demonstrates that, despite statements to the contrary, the law continues 
to discriminate against nonmarital children, imposing economic, social, and psychic harms.‖). 
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sex couples.
158
 Every state has procedures for a father to ―legitimate‖ a 
child, and procedures for the child (or a third party) to establish paternity, 
so that the child can pursue the benefits accorded children of married 
parents.
159
 As a society, we view the availability of these paternity 
procedures as necessary in modern times; however, they did not 
materialize out of thin air. It took the Supreme Court‘s recognition that 
state-driven moral judgment and invidious animus punished children of 
unmarried different-sex parents, inflicting unconstitutional injuries. The 
next logical progression must include equalizing the status of a subset of 
nonmarital children—children with same-sex parents. 
Three key fundamental principles were relied upon to apply 
intermediate scrutiny to nonmarital children. First, governments cannot 
punish their citizens for conduct over which they have no control.
160
 
Second, and related to the immutability of a child‘s status of birth, the 
government cannot treat the nonmarital child differently based on moral 
objection to the parents‘ relationship over which the child has no control. 
To do so is a form of punishment that is likely driven by impermissible 
invidious animus.
161
 The third fundamental principle relied upon to apply 
intermediate scrutiny to nonmarital children was that the denial of 
government benefits impacts such children‘s economic and social 
interests.
162
  
B. Children of Same-Sex Parents As a Subset of Nonmarital Children 
Today, children of same-sex parents are in a similar position to 
children of unmarried opposite-sex parents forty years ago. They exercise 
no control over their parents‘ conduct, yet, because of the state‘s 
 
 
 158. See id. at 347; UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 202 (2002) (―A child born to parents who are not 
married to each other has the same rights under the law as a child born to parents who are married to 
each other.‖); see also COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-4-103 (West 2005); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.53 
(West 2007); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 126.031 (West 2008). 
 159. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-4-104 (West 2005). 
 160. See Glona v. Am. Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73, 75 (1968) (finding that basic equal 
protection principles require that even when a citizen has control (as the mother of the nonmarital 
child), there must be a causal connection between the state‘s regulation and the citizen‘s conduct). 
 161. See id. at 75 (―[W]e see no possible rational basis for assuming that if the natural mother is 
allowed recovery for the wrongful death of her illegitimate child, the cause of illegitimacy will be 
served. It would, indeed, be farfetched to assume that women have illegitimate children so that they 
can be compensated in damages for their death.‖); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 72 (1968) (―[I]t is 
invidious to discriminate against [illegitimate children] when no action, conduct, or demeanor of theirs 
is possibly relevant to the harm that was done the mother.‖). 
 162. Id. at 71. 
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imputation of immorality upon them, they suffer concrete economic 
injuries. 
1. Children of Same-Sex Parents Have No Control Over Their 
Parents’ Conduct or Their Status of Birth 
Classifications that deny children of same-sex parents government 
benefits do so based on an immutable characteristic—their status as 
children of gays and lesbians.
163
 Although most lawyers are well aware of 
the concept of immutability in race-based equal protection cases, a 
persistent strand of immutability principles, even if less well known, exists 
in the nonmarital status cases. The Weber Court, citing a number of cases 
including Brown v. Board of Education, explained that ―imposing 
disabilities on the illegitimate child is contrary to the basic concept of our 
system that legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual 
responsibility or wrongdoing.‖164 The Court expressed its view that it 
could not prevent the social disapproval of children born outside of 
marriage; it could, however, ―strike down discriminatory laws relating to 
status of birth.‖165 The early immutability concepts in the nonmarital status 
cases also influenced the subsequent equal protection law. A year later, in 
a plurality opinion, the Supreme Court relied on Weber‘s immutability 
rationales to argue for heightened scrutiny for gender classifications.
166
 
 
 
 163. This Article does not endorse the view that immutability is a required factor for heightened 
classification. For decisions that deny heightened scrutiny to parties claiming sexual orientation 
discrimination in reliance on the immutability factor, see High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. 
Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 573 (9th Cir. 1990); Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068, 1076 
(Fed. Cir. 1989); Rich v. Sec’y of the Army, 735 F.2d 1220, 1229 (10th Cir. 1984).  
 164. Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972). See also City of Cleburne v. 
Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 441 (1985) (―Because illegitimacy is beyond the individual‘s 
control and bears ‗no relation to the individual‘s ability to participate in and contribute to society,‘ 
official discriminations resting on that characteristic are also subject to somewhat heightened review. 
Those restrictions ‗will survive equal protection scrutiny to the extent they are substantially related to a 
legitimate state interest.‘‖) (quoting Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 99 (1982)); Mathews v. Lucas, 
427 U.S. 495, 505 (1976) (stating that status of illegitimacy ―is, like race or national origin, a 
characteristic determined by causes not within the control of the illegitimate individual‖).  
 165. Weber, 406 U.S. at 176 (citing Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971), Hunter v. 
Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969), Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and Hirabayashi v. 
United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943)). 
 166. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (―[S]ince sex, like race and national 
origin, is an immutable characteristic determined solely by the accident of birth, the imposition of 
special disabilities upon the members of a particular sex because of their sex would seem to violate 
‗the basic concept of our system that legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual 
responsibility . . . .‘‖) (quoting Weber, 406 U.S. at 173); see also M. Katherine Baird Darmer, 
“Immutability” and Stigma: Towards a More Progressive Equal Protection Rights Discourse, 18 AM. 
U. J. GENDER SOC. POL‘Y & L. 439 (2010). 
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Many in the United States believe that same-sex relationships are 
immoral and run counter to traditional family values. One of the primary 
contentions is that sexual orientation is a choice, not an immutable 
characteristic. This Article does not wade into this debate; it is undeniable, 
however, that children of gays and lesbians have no control over their 
parents‘ conduct (or the rest of the country‘s response to their parents‘ 
conduct). They can do nothing about the reality that their biological (or 
adopted) parent and that parent‘s same-sex partner (the child‘s non-
biological parent) decided to have a child.  
A central tenet of modern equal protection law is that it is unfair to 
discriminate against an individual because of a trait or characteristic 
derived at birth that cannot be changed.
167
 The nonmarital status cases 
repeatedly recognized this core principle, and it has also been invoked in 
other contexts to prohibit discrimination against children.
168
 In Plyler v. 
Doe, school-age children of Mexican origin brought an equal protection 
challenge to a Texas statute that withheld state funds from local school 
districts that chose to enroll and educate children not ―legally admitted‖ to 
the United States.
169
 In striking down the provision, the Supreme Court 
made a distinction between individuals illegally in the United States as a 
result of their own conduct and the children of these individuals. The 
Court explained that these children ―can affect neither their parents‘ 
conduct nor their own undocumented status,‖ and that to legislate against 
them ―does not comport with fundamental conceptions of justice.‖170 As 
with nonmarital status children and undocumented children, children of 
same-sex parents are born into or become members of the gay- or lesbian-
headed household through no individual action on their part.  
2. Imputing Immorality to the Child to Deny Basic Safety Nets Is 
Impermissible 
Children of same-sex parents are denied basic safety nets because ―no-
protection‖ states morally disagree with their parents‘ gay or lesbian 
 
 
 167. See, e.g., Weber, 406 U.S. at 175–76; Mathews, 427 U.S. at 505 (―[T]he legal status of 
illegitimacy, however defined, is, like race or national origin, a characteristic determined by causes not 
within the control of the illegitimate individual, and it bears no relation to the individual‘s ability to 
participate in and contribute to society.‖); see also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: 
PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 688 (4th ed. 2011) (stating that the applicable level of equal protection 
scrutiny is determined in part based on whether the characteristic distinguishing the class being 
discriminated against is immutable). 
 168. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 219–20 (1982). 
 169. Id. at 205. 
 170. Id. at 220. 
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relationships and proceed to impose their moral judgment on the children 
those relationships produce. 
Moral justifications invoked as a shield to insulate the government‘s 
disparate treatment of nonmarital child litigants have been routinely 
rejected as unrelated to the underlying purpose of the government statutes 
in question and clearly driven by invidious discrimination.
171
 The degree 
of malice and bigotry directed toward LGBT people and their families in 
―no-protection‖ states is nothing short of alarming. Bob Barr, the 
Republican Congressman from Georgia, for example, sponsored the anti-
gay Defense of Marriage Act, saying: ―The flames of hedonism, the 
flames of narcissism, the flames of self-centered morality are licking at the 
very foundation of our society, the family unit.‖172 In the neighboring state 
of Alabama, Roy Moore, then Chief Justice of the state‘s supreme court, 
openly advocated that the death penalty should be leveraged as a way to 
keep children away from LGBT people, even their parents. In a lengthy 
concurrence in a custody case involving a lesbian mother, Moore asserted 
that ―[t]he State carries the power of the sword, that is, the power to 
prohibit [homosexual] conduct with physical penalties, such as 
confinement and even execution. It must use that power to prevent the 
subversion of children toward this lifestyle.‖173 
Importantly, it‘s not just in states in the Deep South where such anti-
gay bias is spoken so freely and forcefully. The discussion occurs at a 
national level as well. Indeed, the two organizations that lead the 
―traditional family‖ movement on the national stage—the American 
Family Association (AFA) and the Family Research Council (FRC)—are 
so virulent in their homophobia that they have both been deemed ―anti-gay 
groups.‖174 In 2010, Bryan Fischer, AFA director of issue analysis for 
 
 
 171. See Maldonado, supra note 101, at 350–52; see also Nan D. Hunter, Sexual Orientation and 
the Paradox of Heightened Scrutiny, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1528, 1530 (2004) (asserting that in Lawrence 
v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), the Supreme Court ―eradicated the last vestiges of state power to 
criminalize private consensual adult sexual behavior solely on the basis of morality, without any 
showing of harm either to persons or to legally protected institutions‖). 
 172. Remarks from Robert Barr, U.S. Representative, to the U.S. House of Representatives (July 
12, 1996), available at http://www.eskimo.com/~bpentium/articles/marriage.html. That Barr was 
married three times, paid for his second wife‘s abortion, failed to pay child support to the children of 
his first two wives, and, while married to his third and present wife, was photographed licking 
whipped cream off of strippers at his inaugural party matters not. See Bob Barr, WIKIPEDIA, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bob_Barr#Controversies_over_Barr.27s_personal_conduct (last visited 
Mar. 26, 2012). In his worldview, he is fit to be married and to be a parent based solely on his 
presumed heterosexuality.  
 173. Ex parte H.H., 830 So.2d 21, 35 (Ala. 2002). 
 174. See Am. Family Ass’n, S. POVERTY LAW CTR., http://www.splcenter.org/get-informed/ 
intelligence-files/groups/american-family-association (last visited Mar. 26, 2012); Family Research 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol90/iss6/2
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government and public policy, claimed that ―[h]omosexuality gave us 
Adolph Hitler, and homosexuals in the military gave us the Brown Shirts, 
the Nazi war machine and six million dead Jews.‖175 That same year, FRC 
President Tony Perkins wrote: ―While activists like to claim that 
pedophilia is a completely distinct orientation from homosexuality, 
evidence shows a disproportionate overlap between the two. . . . It is a 
homosexual problem.‖176 
Even in more comparatively moderate tones, government actors 
consistently deny gays and lesbians the right to marry in reliance on 
―traditional‖ family values, such as a preference for raising children within 
a marriage, exposing children to dual-gender parenting roles, and 
encouraging procreation. These arguments, as the next section explains, 
are also driven by moral values about families. While opponents of gay 
marriage might successfully employ those arguments about traditional 
families to deny gays and lesbians the right to marry, those opponents 
cannot deploy those arguments to deny children of gays and lesbians rights 
equal to those enjoyed by their similarly situated peers. 
The Weber Court explained this clearly in a now oft-quoted statement: 
 The status of illegitimacy has expressed through the ages 
society‘s condemnation of irresponsible liaisons beyond the bonds 
of marriage. But visiting this condemnation on the head of an infant 
is illogical and unjust. Moreover, imposing disabilities on the 
illegitimate child is contrary to the basic concept of our system that 
legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual 
responsibility or wrongdoing. Obviously, no child is responsible for 
his birth and penalizing the illegitimate child is an ineffectual—as 
well as an unjust—way of deterring the parent.177 
The nonmarital status cases consistently held that children cannot be 
punished based on moral disagreement with their parents‘ conduct or 
relationships.  
 
 
Council, SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CTR., http://www.splcenter.org/get-informed/intelligence-files/ 
family-research-council (last visited Mar. 26, 2012). 
 175. Am. Family Ass’n, S. POVERTY LAW CTR., http://www.splcenter.org/get-informed/intelligence-
files/groups/american-family-association. 
 176. Family Research Council, S. POVERTY LAW CTR., http://www.splcenter.org/get-informed/ 
intelligence-files/family-research-council (last visited Mar. 26, 2012). 
 177. Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972). 
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3. Children of Same-Sex Parents Suffer Concrete Economic Injuries 
The children of same-sex parents suffer concrete economic (and non-
economic) losses. Persistent themes in the nonmarital status cases are that 
children should be protected and our basic system of benefits and property 
rights is designed to afford basic government safety nets to children when 
necessary, like in the event of family transitions or crisis.
178
 The Levy 
Court asked a series of questions that went directly to this concern in the 
children‘s claim for wrongful death recovery: ―[w]hen the child‘s claim of 
damage for loss of his mother is in issue, why, in terms of ‗equal 
protection,‘ should the tortfeasors go free merely because the child is 
illegitimate? Why should the illegitimate child be denied rights merely 
because of his birth out of wedlock?‖179 The court also inquired that if a 
nonmarital child is ―subject to all the responsibilities of a citizen . . . [h]ow 
under our constitutional regime can he be denied correlative rights which 
other citizens enjoy?‖180 Weber also raised such concerns about the 
economic interest of children seeking workers‘ compensation proceeds 
after the death of their father, noting that ―[a]n unacknowledged 
illegitimate child may suffer as much from the loss of a parent as a child 
born within wedlock or an illegitimate later acknowledged.‖181  
Similarly, in New Jersey Welfare Rights Organization v. Cahill,
182
 the 
Supreme Court turned to the economic injury to children as its justification 
for applying heightened review. New Jersey‘s ―Assistance to the Families 
of the Working Poor‖ program limited benefits to households comprised 
of opposite-sex married couples with ―legitimate‖ children.183 The court 
found the law unconstitutional, because the benefits under the welfare 
program were as ―indispensable to the health and well-being of 
illegitimate children as to those who are legitimate.‖184 The very notion 
that some children are worthy of economic safety nets and others are not 
because of their status as children of ―immoral‖ unmarried parents struck 
 
 
 178. See generally id.; New Jersey Welfare Rights 411 U.S. 619 (1973). 
 179. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 71 (1968). 
 180. Id. 
 181. Weber, 406 U.S. at 169. 
 182. 411 U.S. 619 (1973). 
 183. 1971 N.J. LAWS 1008 (repealed 1977) provided that the household must be ―composed of 
two adults of the opposite sex ceremonially married to each other who have at least one minor child 
. . . of both, the natural child of one and adopted by the other, or a child adopted by both . . . .‖  
 184. Cahill, 411 U.S. at 619. 
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at the heart of prohibited disparate treatment under the equal protection of 
the laws.
185
  
As Section II detailed, children of same-sex parents in ―no-protection‖ 
states are denied access to a host of state (and federal) benefits.
186
 The 
benefits that children of same-sex parents are denied places them at a 
social and economic disadvantage in relation to their opposite-sex 
parented peers and exposes them to unwarranted social and economic 
hardship.  
In conclusion, children of same-sex parents are in a similar position to 
that of children of opposite-sex unmarried parents at the beginning of the 
civil rights movement—they exercise no control over their parents‘ 
conduct, yet suffer concrete economic injuries because of moral objections 
to their parents‘ relationships. Children of same-sex parents are identical 
to, or are a subset of, nonmarital status children, and their disparate 
treatment warrants intermediate scrutiny.
187
  
The remaining sections of the Article explore the potential state 
justifications put forth to defend government classifications that 
discriminate against children of unmarried same-sex parents, and offers a 
legal mechanism that states may adopt to avoid the disparate treatment of 
children of unmarried same-sex parents. 
IV. THE LEGAL EXCLUSION OF CHILDREN OF SAME-SEX PARENTS TO 
―PRESERVE MORAL VALUES‖ 
As explained in the introduction to this Article, there has yet to be an 
equal protection challenge brought by a child of same-sex parents denied 
government benefits enjoyed by children of opposite-sex parents; 
therefore, one can only speculate about the justifications that ―no-
protection‖ states might invoke. However, it is possible to glean from both 
the same-sex marriage litigation to date and the historical justifications 
 
 
 185. See Nolan, supra note 119, at 25 (―Clearly, the result of these cases on behalf of children 
born to unwed parents has been the transformation of law and policy regarding legitimacy and 
illegitimacy as to economic rights, nationally. That is, the cases set a floor, which all states are 
constitutionally bound to follow in regard to these children.‖); see also Pickett v. Brown, 462 U.S. 1, 8 
(1983) (―‗[A] state may not invidiously discriminate against illegitimate children by denying them 
substantial benefits accorded children generally‘ . . . .‖) (quoting Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 538 
(1973)). 
 186. See supra Part II. 
 187. It is important to note that a court applying intermediate scrutiny to laws affecting children of 
same-sex parents would not be creating a new suspect classification, but merely acting consistently 
with cases in which courts applied intermediate scrutiny to laws affecting nonmarital children, because 
children of same-sex parents in ―no-protection‖ states are a subset of nonmarital children. 
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raised in the nonmarital status cases the types of arguments that may be 
advanced. In the legal battles over same-sex marriage and gay adoption,
188
 
the most frequent arguments deployed are based in traditional notions of 
family life, including several variations on the theme that child rearing is 
optimal when a man and a woman are present.
189
 Whatever the rationales 
may be, the denial of government benefits to children of same-sex parents 
will be difficult to justify as ―substantially related to a sufficiently 
important governmental interest.‖190 
A. Preserving “Family Values” Arguments 
Family values arguments fall roughly into the following three 
categories: 
First, encouraging children be born within marriage because children 
raised by married parents are preferable to children raised by unmarried 
parents. This rationale focuses on encouraging the rearing of a biological 
child within a marriage, as opposed to outside of it.
191
 States argue that 
they are justified in encouraging marriage for opposite-sex couples who 
have relationships that result in children because it is preferable to having 
children raised by unmarried parents.
192
 
Second, encouraging children be born within marriage because of the 
unique ability of opposite-sex couples to ―accidentally‖ have children. A 
variation on the first argument: states are justified in encouraging 
 
 
 188. This Article turns to these arguments only in an attempt to anticipate what a state may argue 
as justifications for denying a child of same-sex parents any of the previously discussed government 
benefits. 
 189. For a general overview of these arguments, see Carlos A. Ball, The Blurring of the Lines: 
Children and Bans on Interracial Unions and Same-Sex Marriages, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2733 
(2008). For academic arguments supporting these government rationales, see Maggie Gallagher, What 
Is Marriage For? The Public Purposes of Marriage Law, 62 LA. L. REV. 773, 773–74, 779–80, 790–
91 (2002); Lynn D. Wardle, “Multiply and Replenish”: Considering Same-Sex Marriage in Light of 
State Interests in Marital Procreation, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL‘Y 771, 797–99 (2001); Maggie 
Gallagher & Joshua K. Baker, Do Moms and Dads Matter? Evidence from the Social Sciences on 
Family Structure and the Best Interests of the Child, 4 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 
161, 172 (2004). But see Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 217 (N.J. 2006) (―The State does not argue 
that limiting marriage to the union of a man and a woman is needed to encourage procreation or to 
create the optimal living environment for children.‖). 
 190. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 441 (1985) (citing Miss. Univ. for 
Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982) and Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976)); Parham v. Hughes, 
441 U.S. 347 (1979) (applying intermediate scrutiny to the denial of a father‘s claim for the wrongful 
death of his child because the father had not legitimated the child where the government also has the 
burden of proof under intermediate scrutiny). 
 191. See Morrison v. Sadler, 821 N.E.2d 15, 23–27 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005); Hernandez v. Robles, 
855 N.E.2d 1, 7 (N.Y. 2006); Andersen v. King Cnty., 138 P.3d 963, 982 (Wash. 2006). 
 192. Morrison, 821 N.E.2d at 25; Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 7; Andersen, 138 P.3d at 982. 
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opposite-sex marriage because these couples‘ sexual relations can lead to 
pregnancy accidentally, something that cannot happen in same-sex 
relations.
193
 The unique heterosexual ability to have children accidentally 
creates a state incentive to encourage and promote stability in marriage for 
these children.
194
 In Hernandez v. Robles,
195
 the same-sex marriage ban 
challenge in New York, the state‘s highest court clarified this point: ―The 
Legislature could find that this rationale for marriage does not apply with 
comparable force to same-sex couples. These couples can become parents 
by adoption, or by artificial insemination or other technological marvels, 
but they do not become parents as a result of accident or impulse.‖196 The 
court theorized that this potential accident or impulse on the part of 
opposite-sex couples creates a greater danger that children will be raised in 
―unstable‖ homes than with same-sex couples.197 It is important to note 
that New York now allows same-sex marriage; several ―no-protection‖ 
states, however, continue to maintain this ―accidental procreation‖ 
argument to deny same-sex couples the right to marry.
198
  
Third, encouraging children be raised in dual-gender households with a 
mom and a dad. Another potential government rationale that may be 
advanced is that there is a legitimate state interest in treating children of 
same-sex couples differently than children in opposite-sex couples, 
because ―children thrive in opposite-sex marriage environments.‖199 States 
have a legitimate interest in encouraging the ―optimal‖ family structure of 
a home with both a mother and father to provide gender role-modeling.  
In Lofton v. Secretary of the Department of Children and Family 
Services,
200
 a challenge to Florida‘s ban on homosexual adoption, the 
Eleventh Circuit explained that the regulation was permissible under the 
Equal Protection Clause because it was rationally related to the best 
 
 
 193. Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 7. 
 194. Id. 
 195. 855 N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. 2006). 
 196. Id. 
 197. See id. But see Goodridge v. Dep‘t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 963 (Mass. 2003) 
(limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples was not related to ensuring that children are raised in an 
―optimal‖ setting, because extending marriage to same-sex couples would offer a more stable family 
structure for the children in those households); Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 885 (Vt. 1999) (rejecting 
the argument that Vermont public policy favored opposite-sex parents as ―patently without substance‖ 
in light of statutes permitting same-sex adoption and offering legal protections in the event of 
dissolution of same-sex relationships).  
 198. See generally Edward Stein, The “Accidental Procreation” Argument for Withholding Legal 
Recognition for Same-Sex Relationships, 84 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 403 (2009) (arguing that the rationale 
for prohibiting same-sex marriage is no stronger than the traditional justification of procreation). 
 199. Andersen, 138 P.3d at 983. 
 200. 358 F.3d 804 (11th Cir. 2004). 
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interests of Florida‘s adopted children to place them in homes with 
married heterosexual parents.
201
 Florida, the court found, had a legitimate 
interest in encouraging the ―optimal‖ family structure of a home with both 
a mother and father, because of the ―vital role that dual-gender parenting 
plays in shaping sexual and gender identity and in providing heterosexual 
role modeling.‖202 The court dismissed the plaintiffs‘ argument that 
Florida‘s role-modeling rationale was not rationally related to its 
objectives of dual-gender parenting, given that the state allowed single 
heterosexual persons to adopt.
203
 The Court explained that, unlike gays 
and lesbians, heterosexual singles have a greater probability of eventually 
establishing a stable dual-gendered household.
204
  
The moral values justifications will suffer the same constitutional faults 
as similar moral-values arguments raised and rejected forty years ago in 
the nonmarital status cases.
205
 Each rationale has a common theme with 
the now unconstitutional nonmarital status classifications rooted in the 
―preservation of the traditional family‖ arguments. From the standpoint of 
the child, the government cannot demonstrate how these justifications are 
substantially related to sufficiently important governmental interests of 
providing financial stability to children.
206
  
1. The Lack of a Nexus to Financial Stability 
State actors will be unable to offer a nexus to government action 
denying children of same-sex parents their non-biological parent‘s 
workers‘ compensation benefits, social security, or other safety nets. In 
striking down the workers‘ compensation provision in Weber v. Aetna 
Casualty & Surety Co.,
207
 the Supreme Court explained that the decedent 
father had as much affinity for his nonmarital children as he did for his 
four children born within his marriage, and that all of his children had 
lived with him and were ―equally dependent upon him for maintenance 
and support.‖208 The Weber Court made it clear that placing the state‘s 
moral condemnation of the child‘s parents ―on the head of an infant is 
 
 
 201. Id. at 819–20. 
 202. Id. at 818. For further background on these arguments, see Ball, supra note 189, at 2752–56. 
 203. Lofton, 358 F.3d at 820–21. 
 204. Id. at 822.  
 205. See supra Part I.B. 
 206. See Silverman, supra note 2, at 435 (―A child-centered analysis reverses the emphasis, but 
also eliminates some of the arguments leveled against the parents which have been used to sustain the 
denial of same-sex couples to marry.‖). 
 207. Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 171 (1972). 
 208. Id. at 70. 
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illogical and unjust. . . . Obviously, no child is responsible for his birth and 
penalizing the illegitimate child is an ineffectual—as well as an unjust—
way of deterring the parent.‖209 
An example in the context of a child of same-sex parents may be 
instructive. Assume that Linda is the child of a lesbian couple, Mary and 
Jan. They live in a ―no-protection‖ state. Together they planned for and 
followed through on the necessary steps via alternative insemination to 
have Linda. Mary is the biological mom, Jan is the non-biological mom. 
The sperm donor‘s parental rights were terminated. Mary and Jan have 
both been equal participants in raising Linda. Jan, a high school principal, 
contributes $60,000 a year in income to the household. Mary works part-
time in a bookstore and contributes $15,000 a year in income. When Linda 
is 15 years old, Jan is killed by a drunk driver. 
In a ―no-protection‖ state, Linda would not be able to recover for 
economic losses to the household and for her emotional trauma from the 
tortious death of Jan because she is not legally recognized as Jan‘s child. 
Wrongful death claims allow for recovery of the pecuniary loss to a person 
for the negligent, reckless, or intentional death of a loved one.
210
 
Increasingly, states permit plaintiffs to recover for emotional or 
psychological losses as well.
211
 Eligibility to sue varies by state, however, 
and most limit wrongful death recovery to the deceased‘s spouse, children, 
parents, or siblings.
212
 The damage—both economic and emotional—is 
clearly present in this situation after a fifteen year functional parent-child 
relationship. To deny the child recovery based on the state‘s moral 
objection to same-sex relationships is contrary to the basic principles of 
wrongful death actions and tort law—that the dependent child is placed in 
the position she would have been in had the tortious act never occurred. 
Instead, the status quo assures that Linda (and Mary) will suffer major 
economic and emotional hardship. Also, the failure to recognize Linda‘s 
claim grants the negligent defendant a windfall. This result is also contrary 
to basic equal protection principles—ignoring the fifteen-year parent-child 
relationship because of moral disapproval and leaving the child without 
financial compensation for her losses (both economic and emotional) 
 
 
 209. Id. at 175.  
 210. See generally supra note 81. 
 211. See, e.g., Green v. Bittner, 424 A.2d 210, 215 (N.J. 1980). 
 212. These statutory limitations prevent not only members of same-sex families from seeking 
recovery, but also members of many other family relationships that fail to conform to the traditional 
nuclear family. See Culhane, supra note 81, at 942–63. 
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places the child of same-sex parents at a distinct disadvantage in relation 
to his or her peers with opposite-sex parents. 
A child like Linda would be the modern-day equivalent of the children 
in Levy v. Louisiana, wherein the state of Louisiana denied the ―right to 
recover‖ for the tortious death of a mother because the children were not 
―legitimate,‖ insofar as ―morals and general welfare . . . discourage[] 
bringing children into the world out of wedlock.‖213 To deny Linda these 
government resources designed to assist children in exactly these sorts of 
situations does not relate to the objectives of wrongful death recovery. As 
the Levy Court explained: 
 Legitimacy or illegitimacy of birth has no relation to the nature 
of the wrong allegedly inflicted on the mother. These children, 
though illegitimate, were dependent on her; she cared for them and 
nurtured them; they were indeed hers in the biological and in the 
spiritual sense; in her death they suffered wrong in the sense that 
any dependent would.
214
 
In the context of children with same-sex parents like Linda, the non-
biological same-sex parent nurtures and cares for the child and the child is 
dependent upon the parent, just as any opposite-sex family configuration, 
whether rooted in a biological connection or not. To deny Linda the 
wrongful death recovery because of moral disagreement with the fact that 
she has two mothers is to do so on the basis of invidious animus. 
The insufficiency of these family values arguments has been 
recognized in state supreme court decisions that have extended marriage 
equality to gays and lesbians. In 2009, the Iowa Supreme Court struck 
down its state prohibition on same-sex marriage in reliance, in part, on 
how marriage bans unjustifiably impose economic and psychological 
injuries on children within same-sex unions. After deciding that the level 
of scrutiny applicable to gays and lesbians would be intermediate scrutiny, 
the court concluded that the state justifications for excluding gays and 
lesbians from marrying were not substantially related to the objective that 
children be raised in an ―optimal‖ environment with a mother and a father. 
The court rejected this state objective as both under and overinclusive: 
 If the statute was truly about the best interest of children, some 
benefit to children derived from the ban on same-sex civil marriages 
 
 
 213. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 70 (1968) (quoting Levy v. State, 192 So.2d 193, 195 (La. 
Ct. App. 1966)). 
 214. Id. at 72. 
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would be observable. Yet, the germane analysis does not show how 
the best interests of children of gay and lesbian parents, who are 
denied an environment supported by the benefits of marriage under 
the statute, are served by the ban.
215
  
Similarly, in the landmark ruling in Goodridge v. Department of Public 
Health,
216
 the Supreme Court of Massachusetts found the state‘s refusal to 
grant marriage licenses to same-sex couples to violate the state 
constitution‘s equal protection provision.217 The court rejected the state‘s 
justifications for prohibiting same-sex marriage—procreation and child 
rearing—under the most minimal rational basis inquiry. First, the statute 
failed to be rationally related to providing a ―favorable setting for 
procreation‖ because fertility and procreation are not prerequisites to 
obtaining a marriage license.
218
 Second, limiting marriage to opposite-sex 
couples failed to relate to the state justification of ensuring that children 
are raised in the ―optimal‖ setting with one parent of each sex.219 The court 
explained that the demographics of the American family make it difficult 
to describe the average family and extending marriage to same-sex couples 
would offer a more stable family structure for the children in their 
households.
220
  
―No-protection‖ states fail to recognize the changing demographics of 
the American family. Once again, these state actors are driven by moral 
judgment and invidious animus and, at bottom, they seek to force citizens 
to conform to particular behaviors—opposite-sex marriage—and punish 
children to achieve that objective. The rationales articulated, such as the 
―need‖ for a child to be raised in a house with a married man and woman, 
is merely another attempt by the state to ensure the ―legitimacy‖ of 
children.
221
 As Professor Solangel Maldonado observes, the 
marriage/procreation arguments used to deny same-sex couples the right to 
marry ―serve to reinforce societal disapproval of nonmarital families and 
children.‖222 This has already been repeatedly struck down as 
impermissible, however. A state ―may not invidiously discriminate against 
 
 
 215. Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 901 (Iowa 2009); see also Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 
F. Supp. 2d 921, 972–73, 999–1001 (N.D. Cal. 2010). 
 216. 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). 
 217. Id. at 948, 973 (holding that the state could not deny the ―protections, benefits, and 
obligations conferred by civil marriage to two individuals of the same sex who wish to marry‖). 
 218. Id. at 961. 
 219. Id. at 962. 
 220. Id. at 963. 
 221. See Smith, supra note 20, at 322. 
 222. See Maldonado, supra note 101, at 386. 
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illegitimate children by denying them substantial benefits accorded 
children generally.‖223 As with children of married opposite-sex parents, 
children of same-sex parents in ―no-protection‖ states are entitled to be 
placed on equal footing with marital children. 
Further, although beyond the scope of this Article, the rationale that 
encourages raising children in ―dual-gendered‖ households based on 
impermissible moral judgment may violate equal protection doctrine that 
prohibits gender discrimination. Gender stereotypes about the roles of men 
and women in parenting responsibilities are also impermissible rationales 
to deny a child of same-sex parents the equal benefits enjoyed by children 
of opposite-sex parents.
224
 
The equal protection jurisprudence is clear that the Constitution does 
not permit the government to punish innocent children to express its moral 
condemnation of their parents‘ relationships. Such classification ―reflect[s] 
deep-seated prejudice rather than legislative rationality in pursuit of some 
legislative objective.‖225 The ―traditional family preservation arguments‖ 
of encouraging children be raised by a man and a woman are unrelated to 
the very purpose of the state benefits and provisions designed to protect 
children.  
V. ADMINISTRATIVE EFFICIENCY AND THE INSURMOUNTABLE BARRIER 
DOCTRINE 
In addition to invoking moral judgments to prevent children of same-
sex couples from recovering government benefits from their non-
biological parents, states may allege that such denials are necessary to 
ensure the efficient administration of government benefits and prevent 
spurious claims. The administrative efficiency and prevention of spurious 
claims justifications are likely to fail for two significant reasons.  
First, it is morally and legally unacceptable for the government to enact 
blanket exclusions of nonmarital children to basic government safety 
nets.
226
 As it stands now, as explained in Part II.A, children of same sex 
 
 
 223. See Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 538 (1973). 
 224. See, e.g., Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724–25 (1982); see also United 
States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 549–51 (1996) (discussing gender stereotyping in military 
academies); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (discussing gender stereotyping of women 
members of the U.S. Armed Service and the dependency, or non-dependency, of their husbands).  
 225. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, at 216 n.14. 
 226. See Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 772 (1977) (―Difficulties of proving paternity in some 
situations do not justify the total statutory disinheritance of illegitimate children whose fathers die 
intestate.‖). 
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parents in ―no-protection‖ states face an insurmountable barrier—they are 
completely locked out of access to these benefits. ―No-protection‖ states 
fail to provide any legal channels for the parents or the child to establish a 
legal relationship with each other. This legal barricade prevents children 
from accessing government benefits and allows the state to permanently 
disenfranchise them without ever discovering whether the speculative 
parade of horribles will actually occur when it comes to proving legal 
parentage. Second, by virtue of the ways in which same-sex couples (who 
are the focus of this Article) become parents, it may, in fact, be easier to 
weed out fraudulent cases than in traditional opposite-sex paternity cases. 
This section concludes with potential options that states may turn to in 
removing the insurmountable barrier. 
A. The Insurmountable Barrier Doctrine 
Children of same-sex parents face an insurmountable barrier to 
accessing basic government benefits, a barrier erected by ―no-protection‖ 
states. It is impossible for the non-biological same-sex parent to establish a 
legal relationship to the child: same-sex couples cannot marry; the same-
sex non-biological parent is not related by blood; gays and lesbians cannot 
adopt (as couples); and there is no alternative legal mechanism for a same-
sex non-biological parent to voluntarily acknowledge or demonstrate an 
intent to parent their same-sex partner‘s biological child. It is also 
impossible for the child to obtain a legal relationship to the non-biological 
same-sex parent. The government cannot ―create an insurmountable 
barrier‖ to the children of same-sex parents to government benefits and 
property rights.
227
 
A central tenet of the nonmarital status cases is that the difficulty in 
proving paternity does not justify blanket exclusions to nonmarital 
children. In Labine v. Vincent,
228
 despite the joint acknowledgment by the 
unmarried mother and father that Rita Vincent was their natural child, the 
Supreme Court held that it was insufficient to give Rita a legal right to her 
father‘s inheritance.229 In explaining its position, the Court argued that 
Rita Vincent‘s equal protection argument was misplaced because, unlike 
Levy, this was not a situation in which the state ―created an 
 
 
 227. See generally Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. at 539 (holding that because no insurmountable 
barrier prevented the child from sharing the estate Louisiana did not bar the child from recovery) 
(citing Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968)). 
 228. 401 U.S. 532 (1971). 
 229. Id. at 533, 539–40.  
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insurmountable barrier‖ to the illegitimate child because the father could 
have legitimated the child a number of ways, including by marrying the 
mother, formulating a will, or stating his desire to legitimate his daughter 
in an acknowledgment.
230
 Although Labine has been criticized for its 
lackluster equal protection analysis, it did indicate that a baseline exists 
below which states cannot tread: states cannot create an insurmountable 
barrier to a nonmarital child to establish a legal relationship to the 
father.
231
  
In Trimble v. Gordon,
232
 the Supreme Court clarified the 
―insurmountable (or impenetrable) barrier‖ doctrine. In Trimble, Deta 
Mona Trimble challenged an Illinois statute that permitted marital children 
to inherit by intestacy from both their mothers and fathers, but limited the 
inheritance of nonmarital children only to their mothers.
233
 Deta Mona 
lived with her unmarried opposite-sex parents.
234
 Her father openly 
acknowledged her as his child and, prior to his death, he obtained a court 
order of paternity.
235
 Nevertheless, the Illinois Probate Court upheld the 
constitutionality of the Illinois statute and denied Deta Mona inheritance 
of his estate.
236
 
In reliance on Labine, the Illinois Supreme Court justified Deta Mona‘s 
exclusion from inheritance because nonmarital children were not subjected 
to an insurmountable barrier preventing them from sharing in their fathers‘ 
estates—fathers, including Deta‘s father, could leave wills to ensure their 
children‘s inheritance. 
The Supreme Court rejected the state‘s preservation of family 
relationships arguments and the state‘s articulated interest in the efficient 
method of property distribution. Clarifying its position on the 
insurmountable barrier doctrine from Labine, the Court held that Illinois‘ 
interest in the difficulty of proving paternity and the risk of spurious 
 
 
 230. See supra notes 130, 136. 
 231. See Nolan, supra note 119, at 13; Richard L. Brown, Disinheriting the “Legal Orphan”: 
Inheritance Rights of Children After Termination of Parental Rights, 70 MO. L. REV. 125, 163 (2005) 
(―[S]tatutes that impose blanket disadvantages on illegitimate children, without providing some 
reasonable mechanism to avoid those disadvantages, almost certainly do not bear the substantial 
relationship to an important governmental interest test required under intermediate scrutiny.‖). 
 232. 430 U.S. 762 (1977). 
 233. Id. at 764. 
 234. Id. 
 235. Id. 
 236. Id. at 764–65. 
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claims did not support the complete prohibition on inheritance from the 
intestate father.
237
 
The Supreme Court recognized that even when a constitutional 
violation is invoked, the Court must tread lightly to accord substantial 
deference to a state‘s statutory scheme. States, however, must demonstrate 
a nexus between the law and its stated objectives. The Court said, 
―[P]roblems [of proof] are not to be lightly brushed aside, but neither can 
they be made into an impenetrable barrier that works to shield otherwise 
invidious discrimination.‖238 Illinois gave inadequate consideration to the 
connection between the statute and the goals of accuracy and efficiency of 
the disposition of property because a middle ground existed between 
complete exclusion and a case-by-case determination.
239
 According to the 
Trimble Court, the inheritance rights of an entire class of nonmarital 
children could be recognized without threatening the accurate and efficient 
settlement of estates.
240
 In fact, Deta Mona Trimble was one of those 
children.
241
 By excluding an entire category of easily identifiable 
nonmarital children, the statute failed to be ―carefully tuned to alternative 
considerations‖ and engaged in broad discrimination between marital and 
nonmarital children.
242
 As such, the statute extended beyond its asserted 
purposes.  
As for Illinois‘ interpretation of Labine that the statute was justifiable 
because there was no insurmountable barrier—the father could have 
executed a will—the Court clarified its position: ―Traditional equal 
protection analysis asks whether this statutory differentiation on the basis 
of illegitimacy is justified by the promotion of recognized state 
objectives,‖ and ―[i]f the law cannot be sustained on this analysis, it is not 
clear how it can be saved by the absence of an insurmountable barrier to 
inheritance under other and hypothetical circumstances.‖243 The Court also 
made it clear that by reframing the focus on other means to inheritance, the 
analysis lost sight of the essential question regarding the constitutionality 
of the discrimination against nonmarital children in inheritance law.
244
 If 
 
 
 237. See id. at 770 (stating that the Illinois court justified the disparate treatment of nonmarital 
children because ―proof of a lineal relationship is more readily ascertainable when dealing with 
maternal ancestors‖). 
 238. Id. at 771 (quoting Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972)). 
 239. Id. 
 240. Id. at 771–72. 
 241. Id. at 774. 
 242. Id. at 772 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 243. Id. at 773–74. 
 244. Id. at 774. 
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the father had executed a will, the case would no longer involve intestacy 
law.
245
 The state attempted to argue that the absence of an insurmountable 
barrier alone would not serve as a defense or justification to treat marital 
and nonmarital children differently, particularly if the other ways to obtain 
the right or benefit advanced are through other legal schemes not at issue 
in the case. 
The Trimble Court refocused the analysis of the disparate treatment of 
nonmarital children on whether such treatment is justified by state 
objectives. The presence or absence of an impenetrable barrier, however, 
is not the ultimate question. Consistent with the foundation set by Labine, 
the presence of an insurmountable barrier may serve as proof of a state‘s 
invidious animus if it includes categories of children denied access to 
government benefits when they are easily identifiable and pose no proof 
problems.
246
 
In ―no-protection‖ states, complete exclusion continues to exist for 
children of same-sex parents. All children of same-sex parents are 
prohibited from establishing a legal relationship with their non-biological 
parent and are denied government benefits even though, for a broad 
category of children, the relationship between them and their non-
biological parent can be easily established.
247
 For example, in Boseman, 
there was no proof problem in determining that John‘s non-biological 
mother sought to be his legal parent.
248
 There were ample indicia of her 
intent to parent John, including a court order establishing legal 
parentage.
249
  
Consistent with the nonmarital status cases, the concerns of proof 
problems with children of same-sex parents establishing a legal 
relationship to the non-biological same-sex parent does not justify an 
insurmountable barrier to shield invidious discrimination. To avoid the 
constitutional infringement of children with same-sex parents, the first 
step is for states to remove the insurmountable barrier by creating channels 
for establishing legal parentage. As explained in Trimble, it is not the role 
of federal courts to dictate the exact legal channel that states adopt to 
remove the insurmountable barrier. In that vein, the next section will offer 
 
 
 245. Id. at 773. 
 246. Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 266–68 (1978) (holding that there may be some distinctions in 
terms of assessing who may recover but blanket prohibitions not justifiable).  
 247. The Weber Court reiterated the underlying concern stating, ―[t]he burdens of illegitimacy, 
already weighty, become doubly so when neither parent nor child can legally lighten them.‖ See 
Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 171 (1972). 
 248. Boseman v. Jarrell, 704 S.E.2d 494 (N.C. 2010). 
 249. Id. at 497. 
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some options drawn from well-known family law scholars and from 
practices in other states. 
B. The State Options to Remove the Insurmountable Barrier 
To avoid constitutional infringement of the equal protection rights of 
children with same-sex parents, ―no-protection‖ states must avoid the 
blanket exclusion to the state-level recovery of benefits by creating a legal 
framework that permits the creation of a legal relationship between a child 
and his non-biological same-sex parent. 
The point of this Article is not to advocate for a particular avenue, but 
rather to argue that the failure to offer any legal mechanism for the 
creation of a legal relationship between a child and its non-biological 
same-sex parent is an equal protection violation. The legal channels states 
select are within each state‘s purview based on its policies, practices, and 
existing procedures dealing with children and parentage.
250
 Fortunately, as 
a result of same-sex rights developed in other states and legal scholarship, 
there are a number of models to which states may look for guidance. This 
Article will briefly touch upon some existing legal channels, including 
voluntary acknowledgment of parentage, second-parent adoption, and 
marriage/civil unions. None of these models are free from future litigation 
challenges, but raising these options at least opens a dialogue that works 
towards equal access for children of same-sex parents. 
1. Voluntary Acknowledgment of Paternity/Parentage 
As explained earlier in the Article, every state allows unmarried 
opposite-sex couples to establish a legal parent-child relationship through 
a voluntary acknowledgment of paternity (VAP), a simple mechanism 
available at the hospital immediately before or after birth of the child. 
Once an unmarried couple signs an affidavit that voluntarily acknowledges 
that the male signing the form is the father of the child, he is assigned all 
rights and responsibilities as they relate to the child.
251
 The VAP—
Voluntary Acknowledgment of Parentage—process could be extended to 
same-sex couples.
252
  
 
 
 250. See Trimble, 430 U.S. at 771 (―The judicial task here is the difficult one of vindicating 
constitutional rights without interfering unduly with the State‘s primary responsibility in this area.‖); 
KRAUSE, supra note 1, at 42. (noting conflict of laws concerns).  
 251. Julia Saladino, supra note 48, at 3; Harris, supra note 51, at 478 (2012). 
 252. Harris, supra note 51, at 487. 
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This option may be the least intrusive and least costly to states, parents, 
and children. Hospitals in all states already have procedures in place 
whereby willful parties can establish parentage responsibilities and rights 
immediately before or after birth. For a non-biological, same-sex parent, 
completing such a form requires no lawyers, no courts, no cost—only her 
presence and the consent of the birth parent. The VAP is also recognized 
from state-to-state as granting legal parentage.
253
 Further, in more 
conservative jurisdictions, this pathway to parentage would allow states to 
compel economic responsibility for children without ―endorsing‖ the 
relationship of the same-sex couple. 
Still, there are downsides to voluntary acknowledgment of parentage as 
a single avenue, two of which will be mentioned here. First, the window in 
which a non-biological parent may establish parentage status is extremely 
narrow. What if a non-biological parent clearly demonstrated an intent to 
parent before birth, such as cases when both parties consented to and 
participated in the creation of the child through alternative insemination 
and provided pre-natal care, yet split up with the biological parent before 
the child is actually born? Should the child be denied legal access to the 
intended co-parent? Second, voluntary acknowledgment of parentage may 
fail to offer parity for gay men. Situations that involve a surrogate mother 
and two gay men, one the sperm donor and the other non-biologically 
related, for example, may be complicated by the terms of, or legal issues 
related to, surrogacy. 
2. Other Forms of Parental Acknowledgment 
a. Intent to Parent Statutes 
In 2009, the District of Columbia became the first place in the United 
States where parentage of a non-biological, same-sex parent can be 
established at insemination.
254
 The Domestic Partnership Judicial 
Determination of Parentage Act of 2009 ―provides that when a woman 
bears a child conceived by artificial insemination, and her spouse or 
unmarried partner consents in writing to the insemination, the consenting 
 
 
 253. Saladino, supra note 48, at 2, 3; Harris, supra note 51, at 475. 
 254. Nancy D. Polikoff, Landmark D.C. law grants parental status to two mothers, BEYOND 
(STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE (July 22, 2009), http://beyondstraightandgaymarriage.blogspot.com/ 
2009/07/landmark-dc-law-grants-parental-status.html. 
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spouse or partner is a legal parent.‖255 Although husbands have always 
been the presumed parent of a child conceived through artificial 
insemination, this law extends that right regardless of marital status or 
gender of the non-biological parent. Unfortunately, the law seems only to 
apply to female same-sex couples, as surrogacy remains illegal in the 
District.
256
 New Mexico was the first state to create a similar 
―insemination-intent‖ pathway to parentage that extends to same-sex 
couples, not just heterosexual, married men who always were presumed to 
be a parent.
257
 The benefits of such statutes revolve primarily around 
expediency—for the state, the non-biological parent and the child—and 
the allowance for the establishment of parentage before birth.
258
 It remains 
unclear, however, how such statutes could be best applied to gay men 
involved in surrogacy births.
259
 To get around such limitations, states 
might consider drafting statutes less dependent on particular methods of 
reproductive assistance and with greater emphasis on defining a more 
inclusive parental presumption.
260 
b. “De facto” Parental Status 
At least ten states, including Washington, California, Maine, 
Massachusetts, New Jersey, and Wisconsin, allow a person without a 
biological or otherwise legal relationship to a child to petition for ―de 
facto‖ parentage status on the basis of a relationship between the adult and 
child.
261
 The criteria for establishing ―de facto‖ status vary by state, and 
some jurisdictions are inclusive.
262
 What is nearly universal in court 
actions related to assignments of ―de facto‖ parentage status is that the 
non-biological parent must spend a significant amount of time parenting 
 
 
 255. Press Release, Nat‘l Ctr. for Lesbian Rights, New Law Protects Children Born to Same-Sex 
Parents in the District of Columbia (July 22, 2010), http://www.nclrights.org/site/PageServer?page 
name=press_DCparentingbill072209. 
 256. See Polikoff, supra note 254. 
 257. See Courtney Joslin & Shannon Minter, Assisted Reproduction, Excluding Surrogacy, 
LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL AND TRANSGENDER FAMILY LAW § 3:3 (updated June 2012). 
 258. See Marjorie Maguire Shultz, Reproductive Technology and Intent-Based Parenthood An 
Opportunity for Gender-Neutrality, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 297 (1990).  
 259. Intent-to-parent statutes may create unintended consequences in other areas of the law. If 
parenthood ―begins at conception,‖ so might life, and ―life begins at conception‖ is a fundamental 
assertion of the anti-choice movement. Such issues are, however, beyond the scope of this Article.  
 260. See Graham, supra note 8, at 1034. Graham proposes model statute language as follows: ―A 
person who is living in a committed same-sex relationship when his or her partner gives birth to or 
adopts a child shall be presumed to be a legal parent of the child.‖ Id. 
 261. Sanja Zgonjanin, What Does it Take to Be A (Lesbian) Parent? On Intent and Genetics, 16 
HASTINGS WOMEN‘S L.J. 251, 257–58 (2005). 
 262. Id. at 256–58. 
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the child before ―de facto‖ parental status can be assigned. Benefits to ―de 
facto‖ avenues include the allowance of a longer window in which a co-
parent may seek parenting status and also their gender-neutral nature. Gay 
men, lesbians, and heterosexual men and women would all have access to 
this process. Further, ―de facto‖ approaches ―create parental status, 
without necessitating adoption, for a person who does not plan for a 
child‘s birth or adoption but comes into the child‘s life at a later date.‖263 
The downsides here include the significant period of time during which 
the child is left unprotected, in terms of her legal access to the intended 
second parent, the extent to which this status covers all benefits identified 
earlier, and the significant costs associated with any court proceeding, 
which may erect a barrier for some parents without robust financial 
means.
264
 
3. Second-Parent Adoption 
In sixteen states and Washington, D.C., a child born to one legal parent 
may be adopted by another same-sex adult with the consent of the legal 
parent.
265
 The second-parent adoption affords the second parent all of the 
rights and responsibilities of legal parenthood. Second-parent adoptions 
allow the non-biological parent of the child to become a legal parent 
alongside a birth mother or birth father.
266
 Among the benefits of second-
parent adoption is the reality that it protects a child‘s legal access to an 
intended parent, whether or not the child‘s parents can—or choose to—get 
married, ―civil unioned,‖ or legally ―partnered.‖ Further, it is gender-
neutral in its approach, fully benefiting gay men and lesbians, along with 
their unmarried opposite-sex counterparts.
267
 Still, second-parent 
 
 
 263. Nancy D. Polikoff, A Mother Should Not Have to Adopt Her Own Child: Parentage Laws for 
Children of Lesbian Couples in the Twenty-First Century, 5 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 201, 224 (2009). 
 264. Id. 
 265. NAT‘L CTR. FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS, supra note 37.  
 266. See generally Patricia J. Falk, Second-Parent Adoption, 48 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 93 (2000); 
Jason N.W. Plowman, When Second-Parent Adoption Is the Second-Best Option: The Case for 
Legislative Reform as the Next Best Option for Same-Sex Couples in the Face of Continued Marriage 
Inequality, 11 SCHOLAR 57, 63 (2008); Eleanor Michael, Approaching Same-Sex Marriage: How 
Second Parent Adoption Cases Can Help Courts Achieve the “Best Interests of the Same-Sex Family”, 
36 CONN. L. REV. 1439 (2004). 
 267. See, e.g., In re Jacob, 660 N.E. 2d 397, 405 (N.Y. 1995) (alluding to a possible claim on 
behalf of children whose non-biological unmarried heterosexual parent and same-sex parents were 
denied the right to adopt). 
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adoptions are far from perfect as a single avenue toward parentage.
268
 As 
Professor Nancy Polikoff powerfully explains:  
[R]ecognition of a child‘s family should not depend upon the 
family‘s access to court proceedings that require a lawyer and take 
two precious and limited commodities—time and money. The 
nonbiological mother and her child also should not be legal 
strangers during the inevitable period of time it takes to obtain an 
adoption decree.
269
 
4. Domestic Partnerships, Civil Unions and Marriage 
One legal route a state may offer children (and their parents) in same-
sex families is access to formal domestic partnerships, civil unions, and 
marriage. Nine states provide recognition to same-sex partners through 
domestic partnerships laws or civil unions.
270
 Another seven states and the 
District of Columbia allow same-sex couples to marry.
271
 In all of these 
jurisdictions, same-sex couples have rights and legal protections parallel to 
those of opposite-sex married couples, and the same-sex spouse should 
receive the parentage presumption that a child born into the union is the 
child of both parents.
272
 Still, marriage or its legal equivalent is not a 
panacea. 
Many same-sex parents may choose not to get married, ―unioned,‖ or 
legally ―partnered.‖ This certainly holds true for many opposite-sex 
couples who have children together. In this way, formally recognizing 
same-sex couples—through domestic partnerships, civil unions or 
marriage—may still leave some children of gay and lesbian parents 
vulnerable. States should seek to ensure that children of unmarried same-
sex couples experience treatment equal to that of married same-sex and 
 
 
 268. See Julie Shapiro, A Lesbian-Centered Critique of Second-Parent Adoptions, 14 BERKELEY 
WOMEN‘S L.J. 17 (1999).  
 269. See Polikoff, supra note 263, at 267. 
 270. See Interstate Relationship Recognition (May 27, 2011), HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, 
http://www.hrc.org/files/assets/resources/Interstate_Relationships_Recognition_Map(1).pdf. 
 271. Connecticut, Iowa, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Vermont, and Washington 
State. Same-sex marriage in two states, Iowa and Massachusetts, is allowed based on court decisions; 
same-sex marriage in the other six jurisdictions is allowed pursuant to legislative action. See generally 
Issue: Marriage, HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, http://www.hrc.org/issues/marriage (last visited Mar. 26, 
2012).  
 272. In civil union states, these marriage-like institutions offer state-level rights and benefits that 
are the equivalent to the rights and benefits of marriage and they also include the extension of the 
rights and benefits to children within these relationships. See Polikoff, supra note 263, at 214. There 
are some exceptions for states that do not recognize surrogacy. Id. at 214 n.46. 
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opposite-sex couples.
273
 Presumably, the prohibition on treating 
nonmarital children differently than marital children should apply in this 
context, although this area of the law in the context of same-sex parents 
has yet to be explored. In same-sex marriage states, second-parent 
adoptions and other avenues to establish parentage need to remain 
available. 
5. Legal Channels for Children  
The law provides methods for children with opposite-sex parents to 
seek the establishment of paternity on their own behalf. Importantly, 
paternity issues for children with opposite-sex parents are not resolved on 
the sole criteria of a genetic relationship between the child and father. 
Indeed, the law affords a much broader interpretation of parenthood within 
paternity issues.
274 
States should consider the development of similar pathways for 
children of same-sex couples to establish a parentage connection. The 
reality that same-sex couples cannot have children ―accidentally‖ and must 
plan thoroughly to do so lends itself well to the creation of a legal test to 
demonstrate a non-biological parent‘s original consent and intent for 
which he or she should be legally responsible in order to protect the best 
interests of the child. There has been very little discussion of a parallel 
system for children of same-sex parents because the first generation of 
cases has focused simply on getting rights for the parents and their 
children. This will certainly be a necessary remedy as the issues and cases 
evolve. 
6. Preventing Spurious Claims 
In Hernandez v. Robles, the same-sex marriage ban challenge in New 
York, the court opted to exclude same-sex couples because, in part, unlike 
 
 
 273. See generally Mark Glover, Evidentiary Privileges for Cohabitating Parents: Protecting 
Children Inside and Outside of Marriage, 70 LA. L. REV. 751, 777 (2010); Courtney G. Joslin, 
Protecting Children(?): Marriage, Gender, and Assisted Reproductive Technology, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 
1177 (2010) (discussing how marriage only rules pertaining to assisted reproductive technology hurt 
the children of same-sex parents). 
 274. See Part II.A; see also Jennifer Rosato, supra note 54, at 75 (―Courts have even ignored 
accurate positive results of a paternity test. For example, courts have continued to apply the 
presumption in situations where a husband finds out, through DNA testing, that the child he has been 
raising with his wife is not his biological child.‖); Melanie B. Jacobs, supra note 62, at 375 (―The 
marital presumption and estoppel have been successfully used to maintain the father-child relationship 
in the absence of a biological tie because courts know that children rely on established parent-child 
relationships.‖). 
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opposite-sex couples, they cannot conceive ―accidentally.‖275 The court 
essentially treated the advanced planning of gays and lesbians as a 
negative quality of their parenting and child-rearing capabilities. In the 
context of establishing parental connections between children and their 
non-biological parents, however, such planning is anything but a negative. 
Indeed, the fact that gays and lesbians must be purposeful—very 
purposeful—about how and when they bring children into the world 
severely undercuts the dangers of spurious claims. Couples like Melissa 
Jarrell and Julia Boseman (John‘s same-sex parents), and Eva Kadray and 
Camille Caracappa (Nicolaj‘s same-sex parents) went through a number of 
detailed steps and extensive planning to seek recognition. Even if the 
couple splits up, as did Jarrell and Boseman, the steps taken by the gay or 
lesbian couple to become parents offer sufficient indicia to assess whether 
the non-biological parent assumed parenting rights and responsibilities of 
a child. Indeed, the actions of the non-biological parent and the birth 
mother or birth father leading up to, and beyond, conception and birth 
provide clear indications of both parties‘ intent and consent, and a clear 
basis for a child to possess expectations of both of his or her parents. 
This is not to say that there are not, and will not be, times when it is 
less than clear whether an individual from a same-sex relationship 
intended to parent. In Elisa B. v. Superior Court,
276
 for example, the 
district attorney sought to establish parentage between children and a non-
biological parent after the birth mother applied for public assistance.
277
 
The court concluded that Elisa, the non-biological parent, ―both received 
the children into her home and held them out as her natural children; had 
she been a man, this would have made her a presumed father.‖278 In 
instances such as this, when a non-biological parent is rejecting his or her 
standing as a parent, sufficient indicia of intent to parent—or the complete 
absence of them—can make ultimate determinations of parentage more 
clear. Again, when gays and lesbians plan, as they must, to bring a child 
into the world, a record of that planning often will be created.  
In sum, this Article asserts that government-sponsored discrimination 
against children of same-sex parents violates the children‘s equal 
protection of the laws because neither government moral preservation 
arguments nor administrative efficiency arguments are ―substantially 
related to a sufficiently important government interest‖ as required by 
 
 
 275. 358 F.3d 804 (11th Cir. 2004). 
 276. 117 P.3d 660 (Cal. 2005). 
 277. See Polikoff, supra note 263, at 218–19. 
 278. Id. at 218. 
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intermediate scrutiny.
279
 Further, although beyond the scope of the focus 
of this Article, denying children basic safety nets because of their parents‘ 
(unmarried) same-sex relationship is likely to fail rational basis as well. 
The exclusion of children of same-sex parents in ―no-protection‖ states 
offers a significant body of evidence to draw upon in demonstrating that 
the denials are driven by invidious animus.
280
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In 1944, the Virginia Supreme Court, in Brown v. Brown,
281
 upheld a 
lower court denial of Jacqueline Brown‘s request for child support from 
her father because, consistent with common law, ―a bastard was 
considered as kin to no one, and was, therefore, incapable of being the heir 
of any person. No inheritable blood flowed through [her] veins.‖282 The 
Court also summarily rejected her Fourteenth Amendment challenge as 
having ―no merit.‖283  
Twenty-two years later, in Levy v. Louisiana,
284
 the U.S. Supreme 
Court drew a line in the shifting sands of the culture wars and refused to 
allow children to be the object of government-sponsored discrimination in 
its efforts to regulate adult relationships. As a society, we look back on the 
treatment of nonmarital children and are shocked by the callous disregard 
for them and the limited notion of who constitutes a ―parent.‖  
Today, children of same-sex parents and society are at a similar 
crossroads. As this Article has demonstrated, children of same-sex parents 
 
 
 279. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 441 (1985). 
 280. See Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 71 (1968) (―[W]e have been extremely sensitive when it 
comes to basic civil rights and have not hesitated to strike down an invidious classification even 
though it had history and tradition on its side.‖) (internal citations omitted); U.S. Dep‘t of Agric. v. 
Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973) (―[I]f the constitutional conception of ‗equal protection of the laws‘ 
means anything, it must at the very least mean that a bare congressional desire to harm a politically 
unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest.‖); City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 
447 (striking down zoning regulation on basis of mental disability under rational basis because 
motivated by ―a bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular group‖) (quoting Moreno, 413 U.S. at 
534); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996) (striking down Colorado‘s Amendment 2 because it 
―impose[d] a special disability upon [homosexuals] alone‖). For a more nuanced discussion about 
refining the role of animus in equal protection analysis, see Nan D. Hunter, Animus Thick and Thin: 
The Broader Impact of the Ninth Circuit Decision in Perry v. Brown, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 111, 
112 (2012) (responding to William N. Eskridge, Jr., The Ninth Circuit’s Perry Decision and the 
Constitutional Politics of Marriage Equality, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 93 (2012)) (asserting that a 
law that singles out a socially disfavored group for the withdrawal of an important right ―reeks of 
animus‖). 
 281. 32 S.E.2d 80 (Va. 1944). 
 282. Id. at 80. 
 283. Id. at 81. 
 284. 391 U.S. 68 (1968). 
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are denied important economic safety nets—safety nets that children of 
married parents obtain as a matter of course—because of the state‘s 
imputation of morality upon them. Such government-sponsored 
discrimination is not justifiable on the basis of preserving traditional 
family values or to ensure administrative efficiency. Somewhere in middle 
America, there is a child of same-sex parents who has been denied a 
government benefit and deserves redress from this violation of her equal 
protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment. Let‘s hope she 
need not wait two decades, as did Jacqueline Brown, for the law to catch 
up with what she already knows is fair. 
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